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IMPLEMENTING BROWN IN THE NINETIES:
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION, LIBERAL
RECOLLECTION, AND LITIGATIVELY ENFORCED
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
James S. Liebman*
PPOSED for a decade by a hostile national administration,'

faced with the prospect for decades to come of an unsympathetic
federal judiciary,' and amidst declarations of the Second Reconstruc* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. The contributions to
this Article of Laura Dukess, Susan Forest, Aimee Levine, Paul Occhiogrosso, Cynthia
Quarterman, Sheri Rickert, and Jaime Wolf, all members of the Education Law Project of the
Columbia University School of Law, and of my research assistant, Nancy Schwartz, are
gratefully acknowledged.
I E.g., N. Amaker, Civil Rights and the Reagan Administration (1988); Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1332-33 & n.4 (1988) (citing authority); Selig, The Reagan Justice
Department and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 785; Holmes, Bill
Would Overturn Court's Rights Decisions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1990, at A23, col.6 (opposition
of Bush Administration to majority of proposals in bipartisan bill in Congress to reverse
Supreme Court's 1989 decisions cutting back on civil rights laws); Marcus, Goodwill for
Thornburgh Erodes, Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 1990, at Al, col. 3 (increasing disappointment
expressed by civil rights community towards Bush Administration's civil rights policies);
Ostrow, Senate Panel Rejects Lucas as Rights Chief, L.A. Times, Aug. 2, 1989, at I, col. 4
(civil rights community's successful opposition to President Bush's initial appointment to head
the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice).
2 E.g., Note, All the President's Men? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 766 (1987).
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tion's demise,3 civil rights organizations have undertaken recently to
rethink their litigation agendas. 4 I have two motivations for offering
some thoughts in support of that task. First, the civil rights community has requested the assistance of the academy in reshaping the
community's litigation agenda and, in my case, in identifying "new
strategies for implementing Brown v. Board of Education."5 Second,
3 Dionne, Politics: Civil Rights Rulings Have Many Asking, Is the Second Reconstruction
Coming to an End?, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1989, at A20, col. 5; see Savage & Lauter, Rehnquist
Gavels an End to Era of Judicial Activism, L.A. Times, July 7, 1989, at 24, col. 2.
4 Illustrating these efforts are the agendas of a number of conferences that civil rights and
other organizations have conducted recently with the aim in part of identifying new civil rights
enforcement strategies. See, e.g., Agenda of Conference on Education Strategies for the 90's
(Chicago, May 19-21, 1989) (sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for
Law and Social Policy, and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.); Agenda
of Conference on Recent Supreme Court Civil Rights Decisions (New York City, Aug. 15-16,
1989) (sponsored by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.); Agenda of
Conference on the Right to a Minimally Adequate Education: Putting Minimum Standards to
the Test-A Legal Strategy for Educational Reform (New York City, Mar. 27, 1987)
(sponsored by the Education Law Project of the Columbia University School of Law); Agenda
of Joint Housing Conference (Warrenton, Virginia, Dec. 9-11, 1988) (sponsored by the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Law and Social Policy, the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and the National Housing Law Project); Program of a
Century of Civil Rights Struggle: A Conference on Racial Justice in the United States
(University of Wisconsin, Madison, Nov. 2-3, 1989) (sponsored by the Institute for Legal
Studies) Also illustrating these efforts to rethink litigation agendas are the results of longrange planning studies conducted recently by civil rights organizations. E.g., NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Report of the Long-Range Planning Committee to the
Board of Directors 13 (Aug. 1985) (concluding that "[t]he times call for a reordering of LDF's
priorities," in part because of the concerted campaigns... "to reverse [civil rights] progress
and dismantle civil rights enforcement mechanisms"); see also infra note 5 (creation in 1989 of
Poverty Advocates Research Council to develop new litigation strategies to assist the minority
poor).
5 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1). Excerpts from this Article were presented orally during a
session on "New Strategies for the Implementation of Brown" at A Century of Civil Rights
Struggle: A Conference on Racial Justice in the United States, sponsored by the Institute for
Legal Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Nov. 2, 1989. As their agendas reveal,
the other conferences discussed supra note 4 also were designed in part as forums for scholars
to provide assistance and advice to civil rights organizations engaged in the process of
reformulating their litigative activities. The importance the civil rights community has
attached recently to receiving scholarly assistance in the creation of new civil rights
enforcement strategies was underscored by the creation in 1989 of the Poverty Advocates
Research Council, a federation of over 20 civil rights, civil liberties, and other legal
organizations active in serving the minority poor, with the stated objectives of helping
"existing organizations identify new, innovative areas for joint litigation and advocacy" and
funding new scholarly research "critical to that work." Poverty Advocates Research Council,
What Is the Poverty Advocates Research Council (PARC)?, attached to Letter from J. Boger
& F. Roisman to Dr. Chester Hartman, Institute for Policy Studies (Feb. 20, 1990). The civil
rights bar has sought the legal academy's assistance before. For example, the important debate
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my analysis of the principal "old" strategy for implementing Brown,
school desegregation litigation,6 leads me to conclude that it is the old

strategy's capacity for political rather than educational reform that
accounts for our legal system's partial embrace of that strategy.7 The

old strategy's incidental enhancement of educational opportunity consequently is not available to significant numbers of educationally disadvantaged minority children. This Article accordingly fashions an
answer to the call for "new" strategies for implementing Brown by
finding in recent legislation a basis for a program of litigative reform
that fills some of the educational gaps left by a politically focused
reorientation of the principal "old" strategy for implementing Brown.
In order to implement Brown in the nineties, we might begin by
trying to understand it.8 Notwithstanding the decision's
on Brown conducted by Professors Charles Black, Louis Pollak, and Herbert Wechsler during
the 1950's was not simply an academic exchange among prominent scholars but also a
continuation of discussions among advisors to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund on the
strategy that led to and followed Brown. See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421 (1960); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A
Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959); Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34 (1959). See generally R. Kluger,
Simple Justice 529-34, 644, 722 (1977) (discussing civil rights advisory roles of and debates
among Professors Black, Pollak, and Wechsler).
6 By school desegregation, I mean the attendance together in public schools and classrooms
of substantial proportions of white and minority children as a result of judicial or
administrative orders or the threat of such orders. The reasons why I limit Brown to the "field
of education," hence why I consider school desegregation the principal "old" strategy for
implementing Brown, are discussed infra note 8.
7 See Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90
Colum. L. Rev. - (forthcoming 1990).
8 Setting to one side Brown's implications for the debates over judicial review, constitutional
interpretation, equal protection, and the public-private distinction and also the decision's
application since 1954 in a wide variety of "public" spheres, I limit my discussion of Brown to
the sphere the decision itself singled out-the "field of public education." Brown I, 347 U.S. at
495. I do so, first, because, absent a limiting principle, the topic of new strategies for
implementing Brown is too vast for a single article. Second, identifying new schools-focused
strategies is, justifiably, a high priority for the civil rights community. E.g., Chambers,
Adequate Education for All: A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 55
(1987). Indeed, many of the reasons that led the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to limit the
litigation culminating in Brown to the sphere of education and led civil rights organizations
thereafter to enforce Brown's holding most vigorously in that same sphere remain valid today.
See R. Kluger, supra note 5, at 132-37, 155, 163-65, 168-72, 327-66, 511-21 (schools-focused
strategy adopted because of, inter alia, the important effect of education on the opportunities
available to blacks, the strong desire among blacks to improve their educational lot, the dismal
state of black education, the availability of quantitative input and output measures of
educational quality that unequivocally revealed the educational deficits of blacks and black
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"thirtysomething" maturity, however, understanding Brown has
proven difficult. The decision itself has been called "inscrutable" and
has been charged with harboring a "number of possible antidiscrimination principles." 9 So, too, the desegregation decisions that followed Brown I-zigging from Brown 1110 in 1955 to Green" and
13
Swann12 in 'the late 1960's and early 1970's, then zagging to Keyes,
Milliken I, 14 and Dayton I5 in the mid-1970's and Columbus 6 and
Dayton I1 7 in the late 1970's-have with reason been described as "a
patchwork of unintelligibility," "chaos out of confusion," and "surrealistic."' 8 Collectively, the Brown jurisprudence (hereinafter abbreviated simply as Brown) has invited the age's most damning epithet,
schools, the dearth of evidence showing all-black schools could succeed educationally under
existing financial and political circumstances, and the difficulty public officials faced in arguing
that they justifiably could withhold adequate schooling from blacks); J. Wilkinson, From
Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration: 1954-1978, at 40-49 (1979)
(similar). Moreover, the sorry state of the public schools that many minority children attend
today--sorrier on average than the public schools white students attend-reveals how much
remains to be accomplished on behalf of minorities in the important sphere of education. See,
e.g., R. Farley & W. Allen, The Color Line and the Quality of Life in America 188-208 (1987);
A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society 331-54 (G. Jaynes & R. Williams eds.
1989); infra note 94. Third, my own scholarly interests have focused on the meaning of Brown
in the field of public education. See Liebman, supra note 7. Although that focus has led me to
understand school desegregation as a political and not an educational reform-albeit a reform
that applies with particular force to political processes governing schools, see infra notes 54-89
and accompanying text-that conclusion only begs more eloquently the question whether the
educational goals that motivated some of the constitutional lawyers who brought the case and
many of those who have written about it since, see authority cited infra note 163, can be
fulfilled through post-Brown legal strategies other than judicially compelled desegregation.
9 Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049, 1057 (1978); see J.
Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 29.
10 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (discussed infra note 21).
11 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (discussed infra note 22).
12 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (discussed infra note

22).
13 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (discussed infra notes 23, 31, and
accompanying text).
14 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (discussed infra note 24 and accompanying
text).
Is Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (discussed infra note 24 and
accompanying text).
16 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
17 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
1 Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration and Social Science
Research in the Supreme Court, 42 Law & Contemp. Probs. 57, 87, 99, 102, 105 (1978).
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"incoherent." 19 As one observer wrote a few years ago, "[Miore than
30 years after the Brown decision there is no political or intellectual
consensus about where we are, what we have learned or where we
should be going. "20
Heeded differently, however, Brown's meaning need not be discerned from the discordant messages the decision seems to voice and
instead may be descried in the changing tenor of the times through
which the decision has lived. For like the rest of its "rock and roll"
generation, Brown has taken on a number of personalities and politics
over the course of its not-yet-middle-aged career. During the late
1950's and early 1960's, Brown was simultaneously simple, optimistic,
and naive. Its uncomplicated demand for formal equality was made
with the confident assumption--credulous, it is true, given the
nation's history, but perhaps excusably so given the period's flush economic conditions-that nothing more than abolishing "separate but
equal" was needed to end the subordination of black Americans."
Then came the short-lived radicalization of the late 1960's and
early 1970's. Still operating in a period in which economic prosperity
and growth were assumed, Brown veered to the left, away from formal
equality and toward something like constitutionally mandated distributive equality. No longer would it suffice to say, history notwithstanding, that blacks were free to choose and, once they chose, to
succeed at any school they liked. Instead, it was up to local officials
and, in default by them, to the courts, to distribute places to blacks as
well as whites within the nation's dominant social and economic institutions, beginning with its formerly all-white schools.22
19 Id. at 87.

20 Orfield, Knowledge, Ideology, and School Desegregation: Views Through Different
Prisms, 1 Metro. Educ. 92 (1986).
21The emblem of Brown's youthful personality and politics was Brown II, 349 U.S. 294,
which called for admitting blacks to formerly white schools "on a racially nondiscriminatory
basis with all deliberate speed," leaving the means to that end up to the "good faith" of local

school officials in the first instance and to local courts in the second. Id. at 300-01.
22 The emblems of this age of desegregation are Green, 391 U.S. 430, and Swann, 402 U.S.
1. Green simultaneously jettisoned "all deliberate speed" in favor of a demand for immediate
action, withdrew primary control over Brown's implementation from local school officials and
gave it to the courts, and replaced the demand for formal equality-which the "freedom of
choice" plans ruled insufficient in Green seemed to offer-with a demand that "white" and
"black" schools be closed and that integrated schools operate in their place. Green, 391 U.S. at
438-41. Swann then made clear that the Court meant what it had said in Green, namely, that if
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Then followed the ambivalent seventies. As economic expansion
and optimism gave way to stagnation and uncertainty, Brown's latesixties radicalization and outcome-focused distributivism gave way to
a mid-seventies mixture of liberal reformism and moralistic, processoriented correctivism. This new corrective rationale for the Court's
desegregation decisions wavered between a relatively broad focus on
historical and systemic evils, demanding societywide correction, 3 and
a narrower focus on the individual misdeeds of idiosyncratic wrong2 4
doers, requiring isolated compensation for identifiable victims.
On the one hand, the seventies saw desegregation march northward
and westward, reaching Columbus,2 5 Detroit, 26 Denver,27 and
Pasadena, 28 and requiring those districts, as the Charlotte2 9 and
Mobile3" districts previously had been required, to redistribute places
in their formerly all-white schools among mixtures of black and white
students. On the other hand, the conditions precedent to and the
explanations for that redistribution narrowed. It became clear that:
(1) an evil act (deliberate racial discrimination) was required to trigger judicial intervention 31 and that racial separation itself, even when
coupled with vast disparities in economic input and educational outcome, did not suffice;32 (2) discrimination had to occur on a grand
scale in order to justify distributive intervention; 33 and (3) even upon
proof of widespread intentional discrimination in a given urban dislocal boards did not integrate the schools, the courts would, by transporting black and white
children from wherever they lived to racially mixed schools. Swann, 402 U.S. at-29-31.
23 E.g., Dayton II, 443 U.S. 526; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 203, 204, 208, 214 ("all-out
desegregation" orders premised on findings of "system-wide" segregation).
24 E.g., Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 420 (limiting remedy in case to curing violation's "incremental
segregative effect"); Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (forbidding multidistrict remedy for state and
local officials' unidistrict violation).
25 Columbus, 443 U.S. 449.
26 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken I1).
27 Keyes, 413 U.S. 189.
28 Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
29 Swann, 402 U.S. 1.
30 Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
31 E.g., Keyes, 413 U,S. 189.
32 E.g., Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717; see also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding, inter alia, that vast disparities in per capita wealth and
expenditures by Texas school districts, among which were a number of predominantly
minority school districts at the lower end of the spectrum, did not violate the equal protection
clause).
33 E.g., Dayton I, 433 U.S. 406.
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trict, courts were not free to distribute to black children seats in surrounding all-white suburban school districts, notwithstanding that
available seats in integrated schools in the city district had been
exhausted. 4
In the 1980's Brown received little attention from the Court, but the
treatment of Brown's employment-discrimination and affirmativeaction cousins suggests a continuing move away from radical redistribution, and even reformist systemwide correction, toward an individualistic and narrowly focused compensatory scheme in which the
limited remedies available are predicated upon the proximate linkage
between intentional wrongs committed by identifiable wrongdoers
and cognizable injuries suffered by identifiable victims."
In this Article, I search for understandings of Brown that permit
the continued implementation of its original desegregation strategy
and the immediate implementation of a supplemental strategy. In
keeping with that pragmatic purpose, I forgo trying here to divine
everything that Brown meant or could mean were it invested with the
authority to determine the direction of the new age to which we might
aspire.3 6 Instead, I propose arguments and strategies for interpreting
and implementing Brown anew in the disappointing age in which the
civil rights community in fact finds itself.
In Part I, I suggest a theoretical reorientation of Brown that situates the "old" desegregation strategy more securely within the antidistributivist and process-oriented philosophical trends that dominated
the eighties and appear to be well entrenched as we enter the nineties.
Acknowledging that the price of desegregation's politically focused
reorientation is the partial diminution of its value as an ever-ready
mechanism for enhancing educational opportunity, Part II proposes a
supplemental strategy that fills some of the educational gaps left by
the old strategy's reorientation, while still avoiding the for-now fatal
charge of judicially mandated race-based redistribution. The new
strategy finds in the recent enactment of minimum educational-performance standards a democratically legitimated basis for requiring
public authorities to provide children with the instruction and other
educational services necessary to meet those standards.
34 Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717.
35 E.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
36 Cf. Liebman, supra note 7, § III (comprehensive exposition of Brown's meaning).
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THEORETICAL REORIENTATION OF BROWN

A.

The Case for Reorientation

Brown and the cases that followed it embody both a practice and a
justification of desegregation. Unlike others, 7 I do not find much
wrong with the desegregative practicesthat Brown in its best moments
has inspired. Exemplifying the bases for my sanguinity on this score
are some recent data from a couple of unlikely sources that actually
belie the two most damaging charges against desegregation: that it
does not improve the "life chances" of blacks and that it instead
injures their school districts by driving out whites.
On the life-chances question, Christopher Jencks-whose skeptical
reviews of the empirical literature on desegregation have been a staple
of civil rights debates over the last couple of decades 3 8-- concludes in
his latest review that school desegregation in the North has shown
itself capable of erasing one-third of the achievement-score disparity
that normally characterizes black and white children in that region.
If faint praise can sanctify, then Christopher Jencks's commendations
surely have that power, and he has now concluded not-so-faintly that
northern desegregation has "a substantial positive effect on black students' achievement. '3 9 Moreover, improving achievement test scores
is the least clear of desegregation's beneficial consequences. More certain is desegregation's positive impact on dropout, teenage pregnancy,
and delinquency rates; on the likelihood that blacks will attend and
succeed at college (particularly four-year colleges), secure employ37 E.g., D. Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice 107-08
(1987); T. Sowell, Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality? 13-35 (1984).
38 E.g., C. Jencks, M. Smith, H. Acland, M. Bane, D. Cohen, H. Gintis, B. Heyns & S.
Michelson, Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America
(1972).
39 C. Jencks & S. Mayer, The Social Consequences of Growing Up in a Poor Neighborhood:
A Review 65, 55-65 (Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern University,
Apr. 1989), summarized in Mayer & Jencks, Growing Up in Poor Neighborhoods: How Much
Does It Matter, 243 Science 1441, 1442-43 (1989). Jencks and Mayer conclude that: (1) the
"best estimates" of desegregation's cumulative impact are that black students attending mostly
white schools in the North score "something like a third of a standard deviation higher on
most tests" than do blacks in all-black schools; (2) this improvement erases one-third of the
overall difference between scores of Northern blacks and whites, hence gains from
desegregation are "substantial"; and (3) that twelve years in "predominantly white Northern
school[s] probably has a substantial positive effect on black students' achievement." The
authors conclude that no reliable data regarding the impact of school desegregation on
southern black children are available.
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ment in predominantly white job settings, and live in integrated
neighborhoods as adults; and on the salary levels blacks attain in the
labor market. 4°
On the "white flight" question, the only study of desegregation the
federal government funded during the Reagan years-which used a
sample that probably underestimated desegregation's accomplishments and overemphasized its weaknesses 4 1-reached the following
conclusions: (1) desegregation halved the proportion of black students
in this country attending all-minority schools42 at a time when housing segregation among blacks and school segregation among Latinos
(who were not much involved in desegregation 43 ) substantially
increased; 44 (2) the more intrusive-that is, the more mandatory and
40 Recent reviews of and contributions to the relevant literature include R. Crain & J.
Strauss, School Desegregation and Black Occupational Attainments: Results from a LongTerm Experiment (Reprinted from Center for Social Organization of Schools Report No. 359,
Johns Hopkins University, July 1985); C. Jencks & S. Mayer, supra note 39; D. Kirp & M.
Yudof, Educational Policy and the Law 494-507 (2d ed. 1982); Braddock, Crain &
McPartland, A Long-Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent Studies of Graduates
as Adults, 66 Phi Delta Kappan 259, 260-61 (1984); Braddock & McPartland, The Social and
Academic Consequences of School Desegregation, Equity & Choice, Feb. 1988, at 5; Hawley
& Smylie, The Contribution of School Desegregation to Academic Achievement and Racial
Integration, in Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy 281 (P. Katz & D. Taylor eds.
1988); Mahard & Crain, Research on Minority Achievement in Desegregated Schools, in The
Consequences of School Desegregation 103 (C. Rossell & W. Hawley eds. 1983); Pettigrew,
New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 673
(1985); Taylor, The Crucial Role of Education in Achieving the Civil Rights Goals of the
1980's, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. 961 (1985).
41 The survey overrepresented large urban districts and underrepresented smaller urban and
rural districts. See Pear, Adviser to U.S. Desegregation Study Quits, Saying It's Biased, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 30, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
42 F. Welch & A. Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation 40, 67 & table 12 (U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights Clearinghouse Publication No. 92, 1987); accord, e.g., G. Orfield,
Public School Desegregation in the United States, 1968-1980, at 1-12 (1983).
43 See W. Hawley, R. Crain, C. Rossell, M. Smylie, R. Fernandez, J. Schofield, R.
Tompkins, W. Trent & M. Zlotnik, Strategies for Effective Desegregation: Lessons from
Research 3-4 (1983) [hereinafter W. Hawley]; G. Orfield, supra note 42, at 12-13; see also
Aronson & Gonzalez, Desegregation, Jigsaw, and the Mexican-American Experience, in
Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy, supra note 40, at 301 (discussing the problems of
integration for Latinos).
44 On the increase in housing segregation, see, e.g., R. Farley & W. Allen, supra note 8, at
140-45; Massey & Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic
Segregation Along Five Dimensions, 26 Demography 373 (1989); Tobin, Introduction:
Housing Segregation in the 1980s, in Divided Neighborhoods: Changing Patterns of Racial
Segregation 10-11 (G. Tobin ed. 1987) (Urban Affairs Annual Review No. 32, 1987). On the
increase in school segregation of Latinos, see Inst. for Educ. Leadership Center for
Demographic Policy, The Same Client: The Demographics of Education and Service Delivery
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geographically extensive-a desegregation plan is, the greater its
desegregative impact is likely to be, without concomitant increases in
white flight;45 (3) the hypothesis that "desegregation might trigger
such a large exodus of white students that racial isolation actually
increases" is false; 46 and (4) several categories of desegregation plans

in fact seem to decelerate preexisting rates of white loss from urban
districts.47
At a time of increasing pessimism about the willingness and capacity of the public schools to educate minority children and about the
future of public education generally, 4 these data suggest that the
practices that have been inspired by Brown do not need reorientation
at all but rather deserve high billing among available educational
reforms. Thus, to the extent that there is a problem with Brown, it is
System (1989) [hereinafter The Same Client] (Latino students are now more segregated in
urban schools than blacks); G. Orfield & F. Monfort, Change and Desegregation in Large
School Districts 28-33 (Nat'l School Bds. Ass'n Council of Urban Bds. of Educ., July 1988)
(same); F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 42, at 4, 16 (reporting a decrease in proportion of
Latinos attending schools with more than 75% white students, from 24% in 1968 to 13% in
1980); Woolbright & Hartmann, The New Segregation: Asians and Hispanics, in Divided
Neighborhoods: Changing Patterns of Racial Segregation, supra, at 138-57.
45 White flight notwithstanding, the "implementation of desegregation plans is usually
associated with sharp reductions in segregation"; moreover, mandatory and countywide plans
have much "larger desegregative effects than other plan types" and are not well correlated
with white loss. F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 42, at 6-7, 56, 59, 62-67 & table 22.
Combining all 109 desegregation plans examined, Welch and Light found that a 300%
increase in desegregation was accompanied by a drop in white enrollment of only six
percentage points more than what would have occurred but for desegregation; among "pairing
and clustering" plans, a 1200% increase in desegregation was accompanied by only a four
percentage point marginal decline in white enrollment. Id. at 55, 58-59 & tables 19-20a;
accord J. Hochschild, The New American Dilemma: Liberal Democracy and School
Desegregation 60, 64-65 (1984); Orfield, Housing Patterns and Desegregation Policy, in
Effective School Desegregation: Equity, Quality, and Feasibility 185, 202-07, 213 (W. Hawley
ed. 1981) [hereinafter Effective Desegregation]; Rossell & Hawley, Understanding White
Flight and Doing Something About It, in Effective Desegregation, supra, at 157, 170-71.
46 F. Welch & A. Light, supra note 42, at 6, 56, 66-67.
47 Id. at 49-50, 57-61 & tables 19-21a (reporting aggregate postimplementation declines in
white-enrollment loss in plan types implemented in Boston, Buffalo, Detroit, Indianapolis,
Kansas City, Kansas, Los Angeles, Odessa, Pittsburgh, Rockford, San Francisco, St. Louis,
Shreveport, and Seattle); see also Hawley & Smylie, supra note 40, at 290 (documenting
increase in housing integration associated with implementation of mandatory school
desegregation plans); Rossell & Hawley, supra note 45, at 170-71 (in some districts, "shortterm implementation losses appear to be compensated for by less than normal
postimplementation losses").
48 See Boyd, Public Education's Last Hurrah?: Schizophrenia, Amnesia, and Ignorance in
School Politics, 9 Educ. Evaluation & Pol'y Analysis 85 (1987).
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not at the level of practice,but at the levels ofphilosophy and politics.
For unlike in the late 1960's and early 1970's, when mainstream
voices were heard to say that desegregation ought to be used constitutionally to redistribute educational resources among the races if it
could be shown to do so effectively,49 the reigning legal view today is
instead that reforms like desegregation are anathema precisely
because they can and do constitutionally redistribute on the basis of
race. While we waited for researchers to supply the empirical predicate for an earlier period's constitutionally distributive justification of
desegregation, the nation's rightward swing withdrew the political
and philosophical predicates for that justification.
Equally troublesome, the narrowly corrective justification that
increasingly has replaced the earlier period's distributive explanation
has great difficulty explaining our actual desegregative practices.
From the point of view of whites, desegregation distributively overcorrects by imposing remedial burdens on parents and children who, for
all corrective theory can show, are "innocent," and by conferring
remedial benefits on at least some black children who, according to
corrective theory, are not victims. 50 Likewise, from the point of view
of blacks, desegregation is distributively undercorrective because it
fails to compensate actual black victims of intentional discrimination
for the vast majority of the injuries segregation causes them, not the
least of which is a lifetime of lost or decreased earnings of the sort
that the desegregation cases have never deemed compensable.

49 E.g., Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There Is But One Constitution, 7 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 15-17 (1972); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The
Constitutional Concepts, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 564, 583-617 (1965); Horowitz, Unseparate But
Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13
UCLA L. Rev. 1147 (1966); Rousselot, Achieving Equal Educational Opportunity for Negroes
in the Public Schools of the North and West: The Emerging Role for Private Constitutional
Litigation, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 698 (1967).
50 See Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contradiction, Rationalization, in
Shades of Brown: New Perspectives on School Desegregation 75 (D. Bell ed. 1980) ("One
aspect of the [corrective principle] is very, very pernicious: those who are not, under current
versions of the doctrine, labeled perpetrators, have every reason to believe, in their own
innocence.... And why, then, should [they] be called to account or implicated at all in the
business of eradicating the past?").
s See D. Bell, supra note 37, at 48 (criticizing desegregation decisions because of their
unwillingness "to recognize and remedy the real losses resulting from long-held, race-based
subordinate status").
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For these reasons and for reasons I and others discuss at length
elsewhere, corrective theory represents a theoretical and practical
dead-end for desegregation.5 2 A reorientation is needed, therefore,
not because our desegregative practices lack positive value for minorities, but rather because the prevailing ideology, having eschewed judicially mandated, race-based redistribution, thus far has yielded no
serviceable substitute explanation that captures and justifies those
practices. Accordingly, absent overthrow of the prevailing ideologywhich I have not taken as my topic here-what is called for is an
explanation that reorients desegregation in the direction of the prevailing antidistributive ideology.
In the next Section, I briefly outline a promising means of theoretically reorienting the arguments in favor of desegregation. 3 Because
that reorientation only partly solves the problem of redistribution, the
succeeding Section presents arguments designed to neutralize the
accusatory charge of redistribution in the field of education. Because
that reorientation recognizes limitations on the civil rights community's ability to extend the old strategy's educational benefits to significant numbers of educationally disadvantaged minority children, the
following Part offers a new strategy for achieving Brown's unmet educational goals.
B. ReconstructingPolitics Through Desegregation
Rather than being portrayed or vilified in the language of corrective
theory as the redistribution of resources from "innocent" whites to
"unjustly enriched" blacks,54 Brown may be understood and justified
on the basis of a number of less controversial, political-process-oriented capabilities that the remedy possesses, but with which it thus far
has not been credited. 5 Start with the simple and uncontroversial
view of equal protection violations that reigns in the classrooms as
well as the courts today-namely, that the political process has
52 E.g., J. Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 112-13, 133-45, 222-23; E. Wolf, Trial and Error: The
Detroit Desegregation Case (1981); Freeman, supra note 50, at 75, 81-82; Liebman, supra note
7, § III.A.3.

53 For a fuller exposition of the approach sketched here, see Liebman, supra note 7, §§ III,
IV.
54 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
55 See generally Liebman, supra note 7 (detailed examination of the inability of existing
theories of school desegregation either to explain or to justify that reform and of the capacity
of a political-process-based theory to do both).
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improperly counted and acted upon citizens' "whites-are-better-thanblacks" preferences. 6 According to this view, equal protection violations are not based upon any constitutionally mandated educational
or other kind of outcome but rather upon the political process by
which that outcome was achieved. The Constitution is not seen as
demanding some substantive end that legislators, and, if not them, the
courts, must confer on all citizens equally, but only as requiring a fair
political procedure that accords each self-defining citizen equal voice
and respect in the process of democratically deciding how to distribute resources.
An effective remedy for equal protection violations so-defined
would require that a formerly discriminatory political process be
restructured so that its participants are not disposed to continue dis-

criminating and instead are inclined to accord the interests of minorities the political respect that the equal protection clause demands. 7
One way to accomplish this goal, consistent with the design of both
the Constitution and the equal protection clause, is to reconstruct the
political process so that the previously discriminating majority cannot
harm members of the minority without simultaneously harming its
own members.5 8 To use the language of the Revolutionary War era,
the goal is to force prior discriminators to be the "virtual representa56 See, e.g., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 82 (1980) (identifying the "denial to minorities
of. .. 'equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions
that govern them' " as the evil the equal protection clause is designed to eradicate) (quoting R.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 180 (1977)). For a series of articles discussing this
approach to judicial review, constitutionalism, and equal protection, see Symposium: Judicial
Review Versus Democracy, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1981).
57How, that is, can we simulate the philosophers' ideal "initial situation" in which just
thinking is positionally assured? See, e.g., J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 118-19 (1971).
58James Madison extolled the Constitution's reliance on representative democracy in just
these terms. The Constitution, he said, "restrain[s]" legislators "from oppressive measures"
because "they can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their
friends, as well as on [others]," and thereby forges "one of the strongest bonds by which
human policy can connect the rulers and the [ruled] together" and "creates between them that
communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments, of which few governments have furnished
examples; but without which every government degenerates into tyranny." The Federalist No.
57, at 352-53 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see Railway Express Agency v. New York,
336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that there is "no more effective
practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require [as does the
equal protection clause] that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a
minority must be imposed generally"); see also J. Ely, supra note 56, at 82-84 (discussing the
use of a virtual-representation mechanism in the privileges and immunities clause of U.S.
Const. art. IV, § 2, cl.1).
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tives" of the persons against whom they previously discriminated. 59
To use more modem language, the goal is to find social structures or
" 'ethical situation[s]'" that compel empathy on the part of political
60
actors toward the former objects of their chauvinistic hostility.
School desegregation neatly conforms to these specifications for an
effective but still simple and uncontroversial remedy. Assuming only
that schools and classrooms have substantial proportions of minority
as well as majority members, 61 desegregation situates formerly discriminating citizens so that they cannot harm their previous victims
without harming themselves via their own children. In so doing,
desegregation compels members of the majority who are concerned
for the welfare of their own offspring virtually to represent the welfare
concerns of minority parents and their offspring (and vice versa). In
the best of worlds-and, the empirical data suggest, in our own imperfect world-this ethical resituation of citizens induces empathy by
making each person recognize the interests she potentially shares with
all other persons, based on the fact that any harming missiles she
directs at those persons may as easily fall on her own child.6' In Pro59 See J. Ely, supra note 56, at 83-84.
60 Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 26 (1986)
(quoting Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev.
291, 294 (1986)); see C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's
Development 14, 24-39 (1982); Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The
Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory, in Women and Moral Theory 154 (E.
Kittay & D. Meyers eds. 1987); Minnow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
10, 74, 76, 95 (1987). See generally Liebman, supra note 7, § IV.C.
61 Discussing the case law holding that districts undergoing desegregation may not
intentionally or effectively substitute segregation within the classroom for segregation within
the school is Dimond, supra note 49, at 52-53 & n.210. Discussing the social science data
showing that desegregation works best when it places substantial proportions (at least 15-20%)
of each race in each integrated school and avoids tracking and other forms of classroom
segregation are W. Hawley, supra note 43, at 41-43; R. Rist, The Invisible Children: School
Integration in American Society 263-68 (1978); Braddock & McPartland, supra note 40, at 6667.
62 Demonstrating that actually taking part in desegregation dramatically changes the
attitudes of whites towards the value of interracial contact are, e.g., A. Gutmann, Democratic
Education 164-66 (1987) (discussing 1978 poll data showing that 85-89% of whites in general
population oppose busing, but only 16% of whites whose children experienced desegregative
busing found experience "not satisfactory"); J. Hochschild, supra note 45, at 179-88 (1978-83
Harris surveys); Orfield, School Desegregation in the 1980's, Equity & Choice, Feb. 1988, at
28 (1986 poll data); Taylor, Sheatsley & Greeley, Attitudes Toward Racial Integration, Sci.
Am., June 1978, at 42, 48. Discussing the positive impact of desegregation on white attitudes
towards blacks generally are, e.g., R. Crain & J. Strauss, supra note 40; Braddock &
McPartland, supra note 40, at 63, 67-69; Schofield & Sagar, Desegregation, School Practices,
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fessor Derrick Bell's phrase, desegregation impels the interests of
whites and blacks to "converge"-as they must if the dominant race
is to be counted on to improve the lot of minorities.6"

Brown, then, need not be seen as forthrightly or covertly redistributing to minorities certain "private" resources in which the reigning
ideology assigns a sacrosanct property interest to the majority race.
Instead, desegregation may-and to survive probably must-be seen
as reconstructing a political process, in which we all share an interest,
that has gone dangerously awry.
Nor does this view threaten courts with having to order desegregative remedies in spheres outside "the field of public education."" For
it so happens that public education is about the only area of political
concern in which the government (through long-accepted compulsory
attendance laws and publicly funded schools) already has its distributive hands on a sufficient proportion of the citizenry so that the courts
may resituate citizens without substantially undermining their preexisting liberties.
A comparison of public-employment and public-school discrimination illustrates the point. Public employment does not encompass
anything like a majority of the nation's job market, nor is the state
generally understood to control who may apply to enter and who may
exit the segment of the market that the state does occupy. Accordingly, the state cannot easily rearrange all or most citizens with
respect to public employment so that the harms white citizens might
wish to visit discriminatorily on actual and prospective public
employees of another race are equally likely to be visited on themselves. If the state tried to do so, whites would simply seek employment in the private sector or, if barred from doing so or from escaping
desegregation thereby, would vociferously and accurately complain
that their longstanding liberty to determine when and where to work
was being destroyed. By contrast, the state has long been understood
to control a huge segment of the "market" for elementary and secondary education, to exercise plenary control over the assignment of
places within that segment of the market, and to place significant conand Student Race Relations, in The Consequences of School Desegregation, supra note 40, at

58.
63

See Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in Shades of Brown: New

Perspectives on School Desegregation, supra note 50, at 90; Liebman, supra note 7, § IV.D.
64 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
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straints on exit inasmuch as no child may exit the market entirely, 65
nor may any child exit the state's segment of the market without
incurring a substantial financial penalty.66
Seen from this political-process perspective, Brown begins to look
relatively nonredistributive. In the first place, the "resource" that
Brown is now understood to be distributing via constitutional mandate-access to and respect in the political system-is, even under a
fairly miserly view of the public sphere, a public good and, hence, one
that is especially fit for both governmental and constitutional
distribution.67
Furthermore, the dislocation of "private" interests that Brown's
particular distribution of public, political rights necessitates is modest.
Once advocates give up arguing that desegregation corrects imbalances in the distribution of private rights when it palpably does not,
they are free to point out that the rearrangement of private rights that
Brown incidentally does effect is relatively inconsequential and clearly
worth the politically reconstructive candle.
To begin with, Brown's opponents have not produced any respectable evidence that desegregation harms white children.6 8 Rather,
desegregation probably increases slightly the chances that children
will arrive at school safely and increases more significantly the
chances that they will associate with members of the minority race in
later life.69
65 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
66 See infra notes 72, 88 and accompanying text.

67 Cf. M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 85-107 (1962) (questioning governmental
distribution of educational resources).
68 Busing is safer than walking to school, and neither it nor desegregation generally has
harmful academic or attitudinal effects on white children. See, e.g., J. Hochschild, supra note
45, at 58-61; C. Jencks & S. Mayer, supra note 39, at 33, 45, 96; Hawley & Smylie, supra note

40, at 284, 287; Mayer & Jencks, supra note 39, at 1443; NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc.,
It's Not the Distance, It's the Niggers: Comments on the Controversy over School Busing 3,

36-43 (May 1972); see also 1 Nat'l Inst. of Educ., U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare,
Violent Schools-Safe Schools: The Safe School Study Report to the Congress 132 (1978)
(finding that "a school's being under court order to desegregate is associated with only a slight

increase in the amount of student violence" in the first couple years of implementation and
that "as time goes on and larger numbers of students are bussed to achieve racial balance, the

desegregation process ceases to be a factor").
69 Braddock, Crain & McPartland, supra note 40, at 260 (surveying the literature and
concluding that "[w]ithout exception the studies... show that desegregation of schools leads

to desegregation in later life-in college, in social situations, and on the job").
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To the extent that Brown constitutionally redistributes private
rights at all, it is distributive vis-a-vis white parents, not their children. Indeed, the truly distributive aspect of Brown for white parents
is the flip side of the benefit desegregation affords to-no, I'm not
going to say to minorities, but rather-white children. By giving
white children a wider range of choices about the persons with whom
they might associate and the values they might adopt as they
approach adulthood, desegregation withdraws control from white
parents. As Justice Powell put the point only a little euphemistically,
Brown harms white parents' interest in having their children attend
schools that match "the personal features of the surrounding neighborhood" 70 in which those parents have chosen to live-that is, their
interest in having their children grow up to match the "personal features" and values those parents have chosen as their own.
If, however, we take as a baseline the actual world in which twentieth-century Americans live-and not the more (in this regard) libertarian world that, for example, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, Hannah
Arendt, Milton Friedman, and John Coons have envisioned 7 1 -it
becomes clear that even this aspect of Brown's distributive character is
moderate to minuscule. For as the conservative five-ninths of the
Supreme Court recently concluded, addressing both the "Why just
schools?" question I discuss above and the "How much coercion or
redistribution?" question I address here, coercion, though not appropriate in other areas, has long been a part of the public educational
scene:
Green v. School Boardof New Kent County held that voluntary choice
programs in the public schools were inadequate and that the schools
must take affirmative action to integrate their student bodies....
[Green, however,] has no application to the voluntary associations
supported by [North Carolina's] Extension Service.... While schoolchildren must go to school, there is no compulsion to join 4-H or
Homemaker Clubs, and while school boards customarily have the
power to create school attendance areas and otherwise designate the
70 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring and
dissenting).
71 J.Coons & S. Sugarman, Education by Choice: The Case for Family Control (1978); M.
Friedman, supra note 67, at 85-107; A. Gutmann, supra note 62, at 31-32 (discussing
Aquinas); Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in J.Locke, Two Treatises of
Government 355 (P. Laslett ed. 1960); Arendt, Reflections on Little Rock, 6 Dissent 45, 50
(1959).
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school that particular students may attend, there is no statutory or
regulatory authority to deny a young person the right to join any
Club he or she wishes to join.7 2
Indeed, conservative Justices have long been at pains to distinguish
school desegregation from other so-called "race-conscious" remedies
on the ground that the "harms" suffered by white parents when the
state substitutes one mandatory school assignment for another are less
important than those inflicted on whites in other race-conscious remedial settings. 73 Justice Powell, for example, although long an expositor of the view that desegregation constitutionally distributes, more
recently has acknowledged that it does so only modestly:
To be sure, a pupil who is bused from a neighborhood school to a
comparable school in a different neighborhood may be inconvenienced. Indeed, I have said that "[e]xtensive pupil transportation
may threaten liberty or privacy interests." But the position of bused
pupils is far different from that of employees who are laid off or
denied promotion. Court-ordered busing does not deprive students of
any race of an equal opportunity for an education. Moreover, as the
Court noted in Swann, "busing had been common
74 for years in many
schools [sic] districts throughout the country."
In sum, short of stripping the fourteenth amendment of its wellestablished proscription of dispositive "white-over-black" motivations
in the political process and the courts of their now well-established
judicial-review 7 5 -and their logically included remedial 7 6 -role in
enforcing the ban on such motivations, the only remaining argument
72 Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986) (White, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., and

Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in a per curiam opinion) (citation omitted).
73 E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 n.11 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality
opinion); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 737-38 (1989) (Scalia,

J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that race-conscious remedies, although appropriate in
the school desegregation context, are inappropriate in other contexts).
74 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 187 n.2 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
75 See L. Lusky, Our Nine Tribunes 1-4 (4th draft, June 22, 1989) (unpublished manuscript)

(noting how clearly Congress and the public confirmed the centrality and acceptability of
judicial review in the process of the Senate's decision not to confirm President Reagan's
nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court).
76 Although process theorists have shown a peculiar penchant for run-the-process-overagain remedies for political-process violations, e.g., J. Ely, supra note 56, at 102-03, they more
logically ought to seek ways to repair or reconstruct the process. See Liebman, supra note 7,
§ IV.C.
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against Brown reconstructively understood runs as follows: Brown's
modestly distributive incidental costs, even when discounted by the
significant educational benefits the remedy incidentally provides society, 77 are more important than the remedy's effective purging of pervasive or "systemwide" white-over-black thinking from the political
process.78 I have no doubt that some members of the current federal
judiciary would reach this conclusion. But I think they would be less
comfortable doing so and less likely to form a majority than they
would be in brushing aside a remedy that was either redistributively
explained or correctively misexplained.
C. Recollecting the Role of Education in a Liberal Polity
The preceding discussion begs the question of why we consider
compulsory school attendance and assignment less troublesome than
compulsory participation and assignment in, for example, the realms
of public employment or publicly funded clubs. Acknowledging that
Brown redistributes at least incidentally, is there some reason why
that brand of redistribution is more acceptable than other kinds? The
affirmative answer to this question provides a means of neutralizing
even further the condemnatory charge that desegregation constitutionally redistributes.
The nation's history treats the public distribution of educational
resources not only as tolerable, but in fact as positively integral to the
constitutional role of the state. Consider among other available evidence 79 the nation's foundational legal sources, its fifty-one state and
federal constitutions. Of those, virtually none explicitly, and only a
few by recent and grudging interpretation, assure citizens of anything
77 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
78 The desegregation cases do not permit "all-out" intervention absent a finding of "systemwide" discrimination. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203, 204, 208, 214 (1973);
accord, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 457-60 & n.7, 465-68 & n.15
(1979). Compare Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 540-42 (1979) (holding that

a systemwide remedy is justified by systemwide segregation) with Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (finding that three minor segregative actions did not
justify a systemwide remedy).
79 See L. Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education,
1876-1957, at 8-10 (1961); D. Ravitch, The Great School Wars: New York City, 1805-1973, at
62, 171 (1974); Braddock, Crain & McPartland, supra note 40, at 260; Karst, Why Equality
Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245, 266 (1983).
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like a minimum level of nutrition, shelter, or subsistence." Indeed, it
may fairly be said that few or none of our constitutions give citizens a
judicially enforceable right to even a minimum level of public security
or a common defense. 81 By sharp contrast, all but three of those constitutions expressly give the state a duty to provide children with a
free public education and make that duty administratively or judicially enforceable at least to some minimal degree.82 As the Supreme
Court repeatedly has recognized, the state's provision of free public
schooling thus " 'fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government
to its constituency,' "83 "'is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments,' "84 and has always been regarded by the
American people as a "matter[] of supreme importance. "85
Philosophically, the answer is the same. Liberal polities generally

resist mandates requiring governments to equalize substantive outcomes among citizens on the theory that each individual-not the
state-should define her own good and decide what resources are
80 See Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 Colum. L.
Rev. 1103 (1986); Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of
Rawls's Theory of Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962 (1973).
8' See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989);
Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv.
L. Rev. 1388 (1988) (arguing that Supreme Court's treatment of alleged discrimination in
meting out death sentences based on race of victim and other indicia suggests need for, but
absence of, enforceable right on part of minority communities to effective law enforcement
protection).
82 See Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic
Skills, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 777, 814-16 (1985) (surveying state constitutional provisions); Note, To
Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance
Reform Litigation, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1639, 1656-70 (1989); see also Michelman, supra note 80, at
1010-11 & nn.139, 141 (identifying the right to education as the only common "insurance"
right that is constitutionally protected); Shane, Compulsory Education and the Tension
Between Liberty and Equality: A Comment on Dworkin, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 97, 100-01 (1987)
(noting that every state currently limits the liberty of parents to control the education of their
children); cf. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 263, 285-86 (1986) (reserving question whether
federal Constitution includes implicit right to a minimally adequate education); infra notes
240-248 and accompanying text (discussing Papasan and related cases).
83 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291,
297 (1978)).
84 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (quoting Brown I,
347 U.S. at 493); accord Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (providing public
schools "ranks at the very apex of the function of a State").
85 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); accord, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952);
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.).
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most critical to her physical, psychic, and moral well-being.

6

But

those polities generally place the education of children outside the
proscription of distributive mandates on the theory that education
away from the home is a prerequisite to the individual's development
rather than an obstacle to her exercise of a liberal capacity for choice.
Recognizing the need to balance the parents' liberty interest in nurturing their child, the child's liberty interest in developing her own
sense of self (both with her parents' protection against the state and

the state's protection against her parents), and the state's interest in
fostering liberal choice, liberal polities, while forbidding the state to
withdraw children from families altogether, have long required families to yield up their children for some part of the day for instruction
in schools operated
and allocated, or at least substantively regulated,
87
by the state.

Finally, the contemporary political scene lends credence to the singular acceptability and even the constitutional status of educational
coercion and distributivism. Although the Reagan Administration's
privatization impulse led it originally to support tuition tax credits for
86 Discussing the resistance of our own liberal polity to distributive mandates are, e.g., J.
Ely, supra note 56, at 87-101, 135-36, 162; Alexander, Modem Equal Protection Theories: A
Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 3, 26 n.84 (1981); Karst, supra note
79, at 262-63 ("Americans accept wide disparities in wealth and income, so long as the system
remains open and people at the bottom of the economic scale are relieved from the kinds of
deprivation that stigmatize or exclude them from participation in society."); Nagel,
Introduction, in Equality and Preferential Treatment viii-ix (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon
eds. 1977).
87 E.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (stating that state
constitutionally may prescribe a secular curriculum for all children including instruction in
"good citizenship"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); New Life Baptist Church
Academy v. Town of E. Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940 (Ist Cir. 1989) (free exercise clause not
violated by local school board's requirement that religious schools file written reports, employ
teachers with minimum credentials, and submit to site visits and other means of evaluating the
schools' secular education programs); see B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 2628, 139-67 (1980); J. Dewey, Democracy and Education 25, 99-102 (1916); A. Gutmann, supra
note 62, at 33, 134 ("To reap the benefits of social diversity, children must be exposed to ways
of life different from their parents."); J. Mill, On Liberty 175 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1986);
Jefferson, Autobiography, in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 49-52 (A.
Koch & W. Peden eds. 1944); J. Rawls, supra note 57, at 87, 73, 101, 107; M. Walzer, Spheres
of Justice 216 (1983) ("Abolish compulsory education and . . . children become the mere
subjects of their families and of the social hierarchy in which their families are implanted.
Abolish the family, and.., children become the mere subjects of the state."); Dworkin, What
Is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 1 (1987) (noting "popular opinion
that certain liberties, including freedom of choice in education, must be limited in order to
achieve true economic equality").
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the cost of private schooling-potentially the death knell of public
education-the Administration later backed away from that proposal,
and our current "Education President" rejected it altogether."8 So,

too, the recent revival of successful finance-equity litigation in the
state courts provides further evidence of a continuing recognition of

the favored status of constitutionally mandated redistributive efforts
in the sphere of education. 9
In sum, lest historical and philosophical lessons be forgotten in the
coming debates over the future implementation of Brown, whether via
old or new strategies, it is wise to recollect to ourselves, our advocacy
forums, and Brown's adversaries the pure liberal pedigree of govern-

mental action coercing parents in regard to whether and where their
children should attend schools.
II.

JUDICIALLY ENFORCING STATE-MANDATED MINIMUM
EDUCATIONAL STANDARD "REFORMS"

Even as desegregation's politically focused reorientation pays
important ideological dividends, it exacts an important practical
price: It encumbers plaintiffs with a heavy burden of proving political
inequality and distortion, which cannot be directly satisfied by evi-

dence of educational inequality and disadvantage. 90 The old strategy's reorientation thus withholds the benefits of court-ordered

desegregation from significant numbers of educationally deprived
minority children who have not or cannot prove that they have been
88 See Bush Rejects Tax Break for Private School Cost, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1989, at A20,
col. 3; Snider, Parley on "Choice," Final Budget Mark Transition: Bush Pledges His Support
for Choice, but Is Mum on Private-School Option, Educ. Week, Jan. 18, 1989, at I, col. 3.
89 E.g., Colvin, School Finance: Equity Concerns in an Age of Reforms, Educ. Researcher,
Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 11; Fiske, Historic Shift Seen in School Finance, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1989,
at B9, col. 1; Suro, Texas Court Rules Rich-Poor Gap in State School Spending Is Illegal, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 3, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Mathis, Oregon Students' Suit Challenges State "Safety
Net," Educ. Week, Aug. 2, 1989, at 13; Woltman, Montana Legislators Approve EducationFinance Measure, Educ. Week, Aug. 2, 1989, at 13; Walker, Kentucky Officials Begin Laying
Plans to Rebuild System, Educ. Week, June 21, 1989, at 1; Mathis, In Finance Arena, a New
Activism Emerges, Educ. Week, Apr. 26, 1989, at 1; Colvin, California Voters Back
"Guarantee" for School Funding in Constitution, Educ. Week, Nov. 16, 1988, at I; infra note
229.
90 See Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1163 (1978);
supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.

1990]

Implementing Brown

treated unfairly in the political process. 9 1 Also, some minority chil-

dren-for example, those in Washington, D.C., and New York Citywho probably could show historical distortions in the political
processes governing their schools, have no recourse to an effective
desegregation remedy because of the politically affected area's large
size and high concentration of minority students. Particularly if state
borders are considered sacrosanct, there are not enough white children subject to a remedy in such areas to permit effective desegregation. This Part responds to this practical limitation on the old
strategy by developing a supplemental strategy that serves educationally where court-ordered desegregation cannot serve and that deploys
recent political and legal developments against the charge of illegitimate distributivism. 92
Although the new strategy actually is more distributive than desegregation, it aims to be legislatively, not judicially, distributive and
accordingly to erect a tenable bridge from the antidistributive seventies and eighties to the majoritarian nineties. In doing so, the new
strategy draws upon two significant features of the current public
scene, the first giving majoritarian democratic shape and content to
modem educational distributivism, the second suggesting a predisposition on the part of the Supreme Court's ascendant majority to
resolve conflicts between the majoritarian and antidistributive
impulses in modem American conservatism in favor of the
majoritarian impulse.
The first critical feature of the current scene is this: Since the early
1980's, nearly all fifty states-reacting to a widely held and publicized
conclusion that the nation's schools are failing in their educational
mission, 93 particularly as to poor and minority children 94 -have legis91 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (discussed in Liebman, supra note 7,

§ IV.G).

92 The discussion in this Part draws upon J. Liebman, Putting Minimum Standards to the
Test: A Legal Strategy for Educational Reform (Columbia Univ. School of Law Educ. Law
Project, Mar. 1987). Other recent "minimally adequate education" proposals and strategies
include Chambers, supra note 8; Ratner, supra note 82. Minimally adequate education
lawsuits that recently have been filed or are being planned are discussed infra note 262.

93 In 1983, the President's National Commission on Excellence in Education galvanized the
so-called "Excellence Movement" with its conclusions that a "rising tide of mediocrity"
threatens public education in this country and that "[o]ur Nation is at risk." Nat'l Comm'n on
Excellence in Educ., A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform 5 (1983)
[hereinafter A Nation at Risk]. The Commission's report noted, inter alia, an increase in the
number of functional illiterates, a decline in SAT and other achievement scores, and the
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standards that students

increasing demand for remedial education. Id. at 8-9; accord Carnegie Task Force on
Teaching as a Profession, A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century (1986)
[hereinafter Carnegie Task Force] (decline in teacher salaries, autonomy, status, and
competency); Nat'l Governors' Ass'n Center for Policy Research and Analysis, Time for
Results: The Governors' 1991 Report on Education 97-109 (1986) [hereinafter Time for
Results] (sorely inadequate education available to "at risk" children); Task Force on Educ. for
Economic Growth, Educ. Comm'n of the States, Action for Excellence: A Comprehensive
Plan to Improve Our Nation's Schools 10-11, 30 (1983) [hereinafter Action for Excellence]
(damage to personal and national economic prospects caused by inadequate educational
development of vast amounts of human resources); Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on
Fed. Elementary and Secondary Educ. Policy, Making the Grade 4-5, 15 (1983) [hereinafter
Making the Grade] (demands on schools complicated by increase in truancy, dropout rates,
and violent crimes); see Passow, Tackling the Reform Reports of the 1980's, 65 Phi Delta
Kappan 674 (1984); see also Walsh, In Poll, College Faculty Say Students Are Unprepared in
Basic Skills, Educ. Week, Nov. 8, 1989, at 5, col. 5 (Carnegie Foundation poll of 5000 college
faculty members revealing overwhelming consensus that entering freshmen are seriously illprepared for college in terms of their basic skills); Weinraub, Bush and Governors Set
Education Goals, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1989, at A10, col. 1 ("consensus with[in] the
Government and the education establishment that American schools [are] in turmoil and that
the education system [is] increasingly lagging behind those of other industrial democracies");
Cohen, National School Goals: Old Idea Surfaces with Newfound Intensity, Educ. Week, Sept.
27, 1989, at 1, 20, col. 3 (noting America's "[p]oor results in international comparisons of
student achievement and concern about the nation's economic standing in the world"); Boyer,
For Education: National Strategy, Local Control, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1989, at A31, col. 1
(stating that "[c]oncerns about economic competition abroad combined with our deepening
fears about social pathologies here at home have focused attention on the weaknesses of our
schools. Corporate leaders have called the quality of American education 'a national
disaster.' "); Fiske, Impending U.S. Jobs "Disaster": Work Force Unqualified to WorkSchools Lagging Far Behind Needs of Employers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1989, at Al, col. I
(reporting consensus in business community that American schools are graduating students
without the skills needed for sophisticated new jobs). See generally Ericson, Of Minima and
Maxima: The Social Significance of Minimal Competency Testing and the Search for
Educational Excellence, 92 Am. J. Educ. 245, 247 (1984) (discussing causes and consequences
of public belief that students being graduated from high schools lack basic skills).
94 E.g., A Nation at Risk, supra note 93, at 32; Time for Results, supra note 93, at 97-109;
Making the Grade, supra note 93, at 8-20. Documenting the dismal educational prospects of
poor, minority, and limited English proficiency children are, e.g., College Entrance
Examination Bd., Equality and Excellence: The Educational Status of Black Americans
(1985); W. Grant & T. Snyder, Digest of Educational Statistics 1983-84 (1984); H.
Hodgkinson, All in One System: Demographics of Education-Kindergarten Through
Graduate School (1985); The Same Client, supra note 44; Nat'l Coalition of Advocates for
Students, Barriers to Excellence: Our Children at Risk (1985) [hereinafter Barriers to
Excellence]; Nat'l Comm'n on Secondary Educ. for Hispanics, 2 "Make Something Happen":
Hispanics and Urban High School Reform (1984) [hereinafter Make Something Happen];
Office of Educ. Research & Improvement, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Poverty, Achievement and the
Distribution of Compensatory Education Services 11-30 (1986); Ratner, supra note 82, at 78794; supra note 8.
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must meet on pain of one negative consequence or another. 95 Even
more recently, partly out of concern that the state-level reforms have
not succeeded, 96 the President and the governors of all fifty states
95 During most of the early 1980's, national reports on educational quality, see supra notes
93-94, advocated adoption of performance standards for students, teachers, and/or schools.
E.g., Carnegie Task Force, supra note 93, at 55-103; A Nation at Risk, supra note 93, at 27-28,
20-31; Time for Results, supra note 93, at 97-98, 109; Nat'l Science Bd. Comm'n on Precollege
Educ. in Mathematics, Science, and Techology, Educating Americans for the 21st Century 3132, 40-41 (1983) [hereinafter Educating Americans]; N.Y. State Bd. of Regents, Action Plan to
Improve Elementary annd Secondary Education Results in New York 2-4, 11, 19, 37-38 (Apr.
1984) [hereinafter Regents Action Plan]; Action for Excellence, supra note 93, at 10-11, 40-41.
But see Barriers to Excellence, supra note 94 (questioning value of minimum-competency tests
and identifying the risks they pose to minority children). By the mid-1980's, virtually all 50
states had responded to the national reports by adopting some sort of statewide assessment
program to measure student achievement. Changing Course: A 50-State Survey of Reform
Measures, Educ. Week, Feb. 6, 1985, at 11. The vast majority of those programs rely upon
mandatory minimum competency tests in reading, writing, and mathematics and, somewhat
less frequently, citizenship, social studies, and science. M. Goertz, State Educational
Standards: A 50-State Survey 9 (1986) (as of 1985, at least 42 states required local school
districts to administer some sort of basic skills test to students at some time during their school
careers); Pipho, Tracking the Reforms, Part 5: Testing--Can it Measure the Success of the
Reform Movement?, Educ. Week, May 22, 1985, at 19 (pointing out that "[n]early every large
education reform effort of the past few years has either mandated a new form of testing or
expanded uses of existing testing"). Collecting minimum standards enactments are D. Burnes
& B. Lindner, State Efforts to Assess Excellence (Educ. Comm'n of the States Working Paper
No. E-85-1, July 1985); Educ. Comm'n of the States, Clearinghouse Notes: Changes in
Minimum High School Graduation Requirements-1980 to 1985 (Sept. 1985); M. Goertz,
supra; Nat'l Inst. of Educ., U.S. Dep't of Educ., The Nation Responds: Recent Efforts to
Improve Education (1984); State Education Statistics: Student Performance, Resource Inputs,
State Reforms, and Population Characteristics, 1982 and 1987, Educ. Week, Mar. 2, 1988, at
18-19; Changing Course: A 50-State Survey of Reform Measures, supra; see also infra note 102
(listing negative consequences attached to failure to meet standards). See generally The
Educational Reform Movement of the 1980's: Perspectives and Cases (J. Murphy ed. 1989)
(collection of articles addressing numerous aspects of educational reform movement of the
eighties); Resnick & Resnick, Standards, Curriculum, and Performance: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective, 14 Edue. Researcher 5 (1985) (examining historically and
comparatively different approaches to establishing curricula and to assessing student
performance, and arguing that improvement in these areas offers the greatest opportunity for
raising educational standards). In addition to test-based performance standards, most modern
legislative reforms include curriculum-based performance standards that increase the number
and difficulty of courses students must satisfactorily complete before receiving diplomas or
other benefits. See W. Clune, P. White & J. Patterson, The Implementation and Effects of
High School Graduation Requirements: First Steps Toward Curricular Reform (Center for
Policy Research in Educ., Report No. RR-01 1, 1989); M. Goertz, supra, at 13-16.
96 See, e.g., W. Firestone, S. Fuhrman & M. Kirst, The Progress of Reform: An Appraisal
of State Educational Initiatives 23-26 (Center for Policy Research in Educ., Report No. RR014, 1989) (stating that the 1980's school reforms have had only "modest" beneficial impact);
Cohen, supra note 93, at 20, col. 2 (quoting Marshall Smith, dean of education at Stanford
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unanimously adopted a "Jeffersonian Compact on Education" calling
for development and implementation in 1990 of "an ambitious, realistic set of [national] performance goals" that provide "a common
understanding and a common mission" for all schools in the nation. 97
This fascination with educational-output standards is not, of
course, an occasion for unalloyed celebration, especially in poor and
minority communities. A number of commentators have subjected
legislatively imposed minimum standards, particularly those relying
on minimum competency tests (MCTs), to a withering triple-barreled
critique based on the standards' and tests' fallibility, 98 inflexibility, 99
University, expressing "frustration with the progress of reforms" and Ernest Boyer, president
of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, lamenting that "with all of the
effort at school reform in the last few years, we still have not found the formula to move
forward"); Johnson, Bush Will Back National Goals on Education, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24,
1989, at 24, col. 1 (quoting statement by Roger Porter, domestic policy advisor to President
Bush, that, recent reforms notwithstanding, "we have seen little if any improvement"); Olson,
Despite Years of Rhetoric, Most Still See Little Understanding, Inadequate Efforts, Educ.
Week, Sept. 21, 1988, at I; Miller, Bennett: Despite Reform, "We Are Still at Risk," Educ.
Week, May 4, 1988, at 15.
97 "A Jeffersonian Compact": The Statement by the President and Governors, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 1, 1989, at E22, col. 2 [hereinafter Jeffersonian Compact]. See Walker & Olson, With
Goals in Place, Focus Shifts to Setting Strategy, Educ. Week, Mar. 7, 1990, at 1, col. I
(discussing education goals set in early 1990 by President Bush and governors).
99 Fallibility criticisms question the ability of MCTs to do what they claim to do-measure
mastery of important daily life skills. Critics claim that MCTs are racially or ethnically biased,
of dubious reliability and validity, premised on meaningless and incompatible scales and
reference points, and capable of measuring only a single day's performance with regard to a
limited range of testable skills that are- not actually important to students and adults. For
fallibility criticisms of standardized tests in general and of MCTs in particular, see, e.g.,
Bracey, The $150 Million Redundancy, 70 Phi Delta Kappan 698 (1989); Cannell, Nationally
Normed Elementary Achievement Testing in America's Public Schools: How All Fifty States
Are Above the National Average, 7 Educ. Measurement: Issues & Prac. 5 (1988); DarlingHammond, Mad-Hatter Tests of Good Teaching, in The Great School Debate: Which Way for
American Education? 247 (B. Gross & R. Gross eds. 1985) [hereinafter Great School Debate];
Edelman, The Impact of the Mandated Testing Program on Classroom Practices: Teacher
Perspectives, 102 Education 56 (1981); Glazer, The Problem with Competence, 92 Am. J.
Educ. 306, 311-13 (1984); Haney, Validity, Vaudeville, and Values: A Short History of Social
Concerns over Standardized Testing, 36 Am. Psychologist 1021, 1029-32 (1981); Linn,
Madaus & Pedulla, Minimum Competency Testing: Cautions on the State of the Art, 91 Am.
J. Educ. 1, 3-15, 19-27 (1982); Murname, Improving Education Indicators and Economic
Indicators: The Same Problems?, 9 Educ. Evaluation & Pol'y Analysis 101 (1987); Neill &
Medina, Standardized Testing: Harmful to Educational Health, 70 Phi Delta Kappan 688,
689-92 (1989); Palardy, An Analogy for Reviewing Promotion/Retention and Minimum
Competency Decisions, 104 Education 401, 401-04 (1984); Peterson, Minimum Competency
Testing: Issues to Consider, 15 Am. Secondary Edue. 17, 18 (1986); Wiggins, A True Test:
Toward More Authentic and Equitable Assessment, .70 Phi Delta Kappan 703, 703-05, 708
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In the last regard, these critics argue with much

(1989); see also S. Korcheck, Measuring Student Learning: Statewide Student Assessment
Programs in the SREB States 3 (S. Regional Educ. Bd., 1988) (summarizing a review of 19861987 standardized test scores that "shows that student achievement was at or above the
national average in virtually every [southern] state at every grade level in every subject area
tested").
99 Inflexibility criticisms contend that because of their rigidity, tests and other fixed
measures of quality have harmful educational effects. These negative effects include: the
numbing constraints imposed on curriculum and teaching methods by the necessity of enabling
children above all else to pass tests; the devaluation of such untestable subjects and goals as
writing, graphic and performing arts, critical thought, problem solving, creativity, and
leadership; repression of bright students; deemphasis on learning for its own sake and
trivialization of knowledge and thinking into matters of multiple choice; and the devolution of
control over education from the local to the state level of government. E.g., Comm. of
Correspondence, Education for a Democratic Future, in Great School Debate, supra note 98,
at 374, 381-83; Barriers to Excellence, supra note 94, at 47; Darling-Hammond, supra note 98,
at 250-51; Down, Assassins of Excellence, in Great School Debate, supra note 98, at 273, 278
(characterizing minimum competency testing as "new version of mediocrity masquerading as
excellence"); Gregoire, Don't Judge Me by Tests, in Great School Debate, supra note 98, at
252; Haney & Madaus, Searching for Alternatives to Standardized Tests: Whys, Whats, and
Whithers, 70 Phi Delta Kappan 683 (1989); Howe, Giving Equity a Chance in the Excellence
Game, in Great School Debate, supra note 98, at 281, 284; Neill & Medina, supra note 98, at
692-95 (comprehensive survey of ill effects of standardized testing); Paulson & Ball, Back to
Basics: Minimum Competency Testing and its Impact on Minorities, 19 Urb. Educ. 5, 7-8
(1984); Raywid, The Coming Centralization of Education, in Great School Debate, supra note
98, at 400, 403-04; Wiggins, "Standards" Should Mean "Qualities," Not Quantities, Educ.
Week, Jan. 24, 1990, at 36, col. 2; Texas Officials Modify State Assessment to Minimize Ways
to "Teach to the Test," Educ. Week, Mar. 29, 1989, at 7, col. 1; Olson, Eight Southern States
Compare Student Achievement, Educ. Week, Oct. 1, 1986, at 5, col. 1 (Louisiana officials
conclude that MCTs cause lower achievement in average to above-average students).
100According to the inequity critique, performance standards for students, although
potentially useful to diagnose and remedy deficiencies in students' basic skills and schools'
pedagogical techniques, are used in fact to mark disproportionate numbers of poor and
minority children as failures and thereby to deprive them of higher educational and
employment opportunities. E.g., Barriers to Excellence, supra note 94, at 46; Glazer, supra
note 98, at 312; Paulson & Ball, supra note 99, at 8; Serow, Effects of Minimum Competency
Testing for Minority Students, 16 Urb. Rev. 67, 73-74 (1984) (finding that blacks have a
substantially lower pass rate than other groups on MCTs and are disproportionately likely to
be sanctioned by loss of diploma for failure to pass tests). Of particular concern is the
possibility that the negative self-concept caused by the failure to satisfy performance standards
and the anticipated denial of the only tangible benefit disadvantaged students have to gain
from competing in school will "push" those students out of school. Barriers to Excellence,
supra note 94, at 6-7; see H. Hodgkinson, supra note 94, at 12; Time for Results, supra note 93,
at 14; McDill, Natriello & Pallas, A Population at Risk: Potential Consequences of Tougher
School Standards for Student Dropouts, 94 Am. J. Educ. 135 (1986); Paulson & Ball, supra
note 99, at 8; Peterson, supra note 98, at 18; Serow, supra, at 73; Fiske, Making Low Achievers
Repeat a Grade: Though Applauded, It Doesn't Work, Studies Show, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24,
1990, at B5, col. 6. Preliminary data suggest a link between increased use of MCTs and higher
dropout rates. See Serow, supra, at 73; Texas Poll Ties Dropout-Rate Climb to Reforms,
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force that the imposition of higher standards on poor and minority
children than they currently can satisfy, without a concomitant
change in instructional environment, can only hurt those children.
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that many states have enacted
minimum-standards legislation without providing remedial services"'
to children who do not meet the standards on the first try, thus suggesting that the standards' primary purpose is exclusion, not diagnosis
or resource allocation.10 2 As one commentator notes, "a majority of
Educ. Week, May 21, 1986, at 4, col. 3. But see W. Clune, P. White & J. Patterson, supra note
95,at 27 (surveying "[e]merging quantitative data" that link "higher standards to lower mean
dropout rates" (emphasis added)).
101By remedial services, a term used throughout this Article, I do not mean "pull-out"
remedial classes and tracks but rather instructional techniques (probably not including pullout devices) that effectively overcome students' educational deficits. See Rothman, In an
Effort to Boost Achievement, Denver Abolishes Remedial Classes, Educ. Week, Oct. 11, 1989,
at 1.
102 Minimum competency tests may be used to diagnose capabilities and deficiencies, to
allocate services or resources, and to exclude persons or institutions from eligibility for benefits
available to those that do meet the standards. Arkansas, New Jersey, and New York, for
example, use intensive testing programs diagnostically to identify students lacking basic skills
and schools in need of improvement, allocatively to determine students' need and eligibility for
remedial services and schools' eligibility for certain dedicated funds, and exclusionarily to deny
students diplomas and to single out "failing" schools. See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 3602(1)(e)
(McKinney 1990); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, §§ l00.2(m)(1)(i), 100.3(b)(2)-(3),
100.4(d)-(f), 100.5(a)(4), 149-1 (1989); M. Goertz, supra note 95, at 35, 95; Verhovek, Albany
Issues List of Schools in Trouble, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1989, at Bi, col. 1; The 338 Worst
Public Schools-and We Name Them All, N.Y. Post, Dec. 10, 1985. On the increasing
diagnostic use of student test scores as a basis for measuring school quality and identifying
schools in need of improvement, see Illinois Superintendent Proposes Outcome-Based
Regulatory System, Educ. Week, Feb. 14, 1990, at 2, col. 3 (recommendation of state
superintendent that state rate and regulate schools based on test scores and other outcome
measures); Rothman, States Turn to Student Performance as New Measure of School Quality,
Educ. Week, Nov. 8, 1989, at 1, col. 3 (majority of states now use measures of instructional
outcomes as basis for assessing quality of schools in state); see also M, Goertz, supra note 95,
at 11-12 (noting that, as of 1985, eight states were using test scores to decide how to distribute
state educational funds; 20 offered remedial services to students who fall below standard);
Connecticut to Link Aid, Test Scores, Educ. Week, May 25, 1988, at 10 (Connecticut plan to
distribute aid to school districts based on number of students scoring below the remedial level
and on test-score improvement rates). A substantial number of states use their testing
programs in a primarily exclusionary fashion. M. Goertz, supra note 95, at 11-12 (noting that
in 1985 survey, of 24 states that made test scores a basis for denial of promotion, matriculation,
or a diploma, 11 made no provision for remedial services to students falling below standard);
H. Hodgkinson, supra note 94, at 12. Among the negative or exclusionary consequences that
minimum-standards legislation may impose on students falling below standard are placement
in lower tracks and denial of eligibility for promotion to a higher grade, to matriculate to
another school, to take part in extracurricular activities, to receive a diploma or graduate, to
receive a driver's license, and to attend a state university. M. Goertz, supra note 95, at 10, 27-
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the 'reform' States have, in essence, moved up the high jump bar from
four to six feet without giving any additional coaching to the youth
who were not clearing the bar when it was at four feet."'0

3

These events create two possible courses of action. One calls for
poor and minority communities to mobilize in opposition to minimum standards on the grounds that they inevitably will be used
against poor and minority children and are discriminatory, educationally anathema, and unlawful.? 4 The other course of action seeks to
harness minimum standards' educational-improvement impulses by
enforcing standards on behalf of poor and minority children and
againstincompetent school officials, ineffective schools, and impotent
educational practices.
In keeping with the general "go-with-the-political-flow" posture
adopted in Part I, and given the tidal wave of support for minimumperformance standards10 5 and the swelling concern within the "Excellence Movement" about the educational status of minority children, 10 6 I here explore the latter option. Put most simply, I examine
134; see also Birmingham Drops Skills Test as Requirement for Promotion, Educ. Week, Nov.
1, 1989, at 3, col. 1 (test scores eliminated as decisive basis for determining promotion to
second through eighth grades because its principal effect was to prevent hundreds of students
who passed all their courses from passing to the next grade).
103 H. Hodgkinson, supra note 94, at 11-12.
104 See Center for Law and Educ., Minimum Competency Testing: A Manual for Legal
Services Programs (1979); Logar, Minimum Competency Testing in Schools: Legislative
Action and Judicial Review, 13 J.L. & Educ. 35 (1984); Snider, State Mandates, Equity Law:
On a Collision Course?, Educ. Week, Feb. 18, 1988, at 2; see also McClung, Competency
Testing Programs: Legal and Educational Issues, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 651 (1979) (describing
possible legal challenges to minimum standards and suggesting approaches state officials can
take to avoid such challenges); Note, Testing the Tests, The Due Process Implications of
Minimum Competency Testing, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 577, 618 (1984) (arguing that minimum
standards might violate due process if safeguards are not provided to protect important liberty
interests of students).
105The recent coalescing of political support for performance standards was reflected in a
Gallup Poll, in which 70% of respondents favored "requiring public schools to conform to
national achievement goals." Performance standards also have the support of the nation's two
largest teachers' unions and of the educational specialty groups responsible for designing
standards for their specialty. Cohen, supra note 93, at 20, cols. 1-2. This relatively
longstanding consensus among educational advocates has extended to the business community
and to politicians at the state and federal levels, in the legislative and executive branches, and
in both parties. Id.
106 E.g., Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of Teaching, An Imperiled GenerationSaving Urban Schools (1988); Council of Chief State School Officers Study Comm., Children
at Risk: The Work of the States (Oct. 1987); Council of Chief State School Officers, Elements
of a Model State Statute to Provide Educational Entitlements for At-Risk Students (Nov.
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the capacity of poor and minority communities to use the enactment

into law of minimum educational-performance standards as a basis
for inferring and enforcing a democratically legitimated obligation on
the part of public authorities to distribute to children the educational
means necessary to satisfy those standards." 7
The second feature of the early 1990's that bears favorably on the
proposed strategy's likelihood of success is the preeminence the ascen-

dant wing of the Supreme Court has given recently to majoritarian
decisionmaking.'0 8 The Court's majoritarianism has two generally
favorable implications for the strategy proposed here. First, it concentrates the Court's undoubted skepticism about litigative reform
efforts on a characteristic of many such efforts that the strategy pro-

posed here suppresses, namely, the demand that judges sanctify and
enforce substantive values in the process of constitutional interpretation. 10 9 Second, as long as the distributive impulse being enforced
1987); The Same Client, supra note 44; Barriers to Excellence, supra note 94, at 6-7; A Nation
at Risk, supra note 93, at 13, 32; Time for Results, supra note 93, at 14-15, 97-98, 107;
Educating Americans, supra note 95, at vi-vii; Action for Excellence, supra note 93, at 44;
Making the Grade, supra note 93, at 15; Jeffersonian Compact, supra note 97; Weinraub, supra
note 93, at AI0, col. 1 (reporting President Bush's statement that reforms should "[e]xploit[]
the potential of every student, not only those who are gifted but also the 'average students' and
the disadvantaged"); Johnson, supra note 96, at 24, col. 1 (reporting statements by Secretary of
Education Cavazos and congressional Democrats that goals should be set for "reducing
dropout rates, particularly among black and nonwhite Hispanic students," "narrowing the gap
between the standardized test scores of white and minority students," and "raising college
enrollment, particularly among minorities"); U.S. Calls Education of Poor a Priority, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 14, 1987, at B3, col. 1. But see Mathis, Children at Risk: "There's a Lot More
Oratory than Real Money," Educ. Week, Apr. 26, 1989, at 9.
107 Most of the legal theories developed below are available to all communities beset by
failing schools. I nonetheless refer throughout this Part to "poor and minority" communities
because that is the audience I am addressing here and, in any event, because the number of
affluent white communities with failing schools is small.
108 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 61-74 (1989).
109 E.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2980 (1989) (plurality opinion); Michael H.
v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 (1989) (plurality opinion); DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
191 (1986). One could argue that this "interpretive" aspect of the majoritarian-democratic
impulse, see infra note 256 and accompanying text, dooms school desegregation, even as
reoriented in Part I, because of the priority school desegregation strategies accord to equality
when that interest collides with the will of the majority. As I develop elsewhere, however,
most theories of democracy include an equality principle that assures all citizens of equal
concern and respect in the democratic process. See Liebman, supra note 7, § III.B. 1.
Accordingly, by reorienting school desegregation as a political reform, that strategy can be
seen as serving and not as opposing the priority of democracy. See id. In any event, if the
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through litigation can be shown to arise out of the democratic process, the Court's majoritarianism leaves it less sympathetic to the conservative objection to reform efforts generally that they involve the
state in redistributing wealth."11 Put differently, the nineties seem ripe
for a reform strategy that distributes resources not, like desegregation,
on the basis of judicially "discovered" constitutional norms, but
rather on the basis of democratically enacted majoritarian standards.
Cutting against these favorable consequences of the Court's majoritarianism is an unfavorable consequence: the disposition of some of
the Court's conservative members to interpret statutes narrowly."'
Given its cross-cutting implications, this second feature of the modem
scene, unlike the first, is unlikely to increase the propulsive political

force behind the proposed strategy. Still, majoritarian predilections
may decrease somewhat the modem judiciary's predictable resistance
to litigatively powered reform efforts insofar as the strategy's proponents can establish the majoritarian-democratic bona fides of the distributive impulses that the strategy seeks to harness.

majoritarian-democratic impulse does undercut the old strategy, even as reoriented, it
emphasizes all the more the need for the new strategy proposed here.
110E.g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 109 S. Ct. 1726 (1989) (upholding
constitutionality of statute authorizing Secretary of Transportation to impose user fees to cover
costs of federal pipeline safety programs); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988)
(holding that rent control ordinance that allows hearing officer to fix reasonable rent based in
part on hardship of the tenant does not violate due process or equal protection clauses; takings
issue deemed unripe); see Chemerinsky, supra note 108, at 50-51 (distinguishing Lochner and
current judicial era in part on this basis). But see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.
Ct. 706 (1989) (invalidating city's democratically adopted affirmative action program favoring
minority contractors).
III E.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1831-34 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570
(1982). The Court is by no means uniformly disposed to interpret statutes narrowly. Recent
decisions reflecting a relatively broad approach to legislative interpretation include Shell Oil
Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 109 S. Ct. 278, 281 n.6 (1988); EEOC v. Commercial Office
Prods. Co., 108 S. Ct. 1666, 1671-74 (1988); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479
U.S. 272, 284-86 (1987) (plurality opinion); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of
Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1986); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 591-96 (1983). On the relationship between majoritarian theory and legislative
interpretation, see, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983);
Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J. 319 (1989); Eskridge & Frickey, 42
Stan. L. Rev. 321 (1990); Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo.
L.J. 281 (1989).
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The hypotheses underlying the strategy proposed here are these: By
promulgating the various educational-performance standards and
overlaying them on America's traditional system of compulsory and
publicly available education, legislators have authoritatively identified
those standards as the measure of a "minimally adequate education."
(Although judges have refused to identify such a measure on their
own, they now can use the democratically legitimized measure that
state legislators have identified to gauge the sufficiency not only of the
"education" individual children acquire, but also of the "education"
public schools afford.) In addition, by promulgating standards and
applying them to all children-whom the state compels to attend
school and to meet performance standards or be stigmatized by force
of state law-the states have committed themselves to the assumption
(another step the courts have refused to take by themselves) that all
children are capable of satisfying minimum standards. By taking
these steps, legislators have fashioned the components of an enforceable duty on the part of school officials to provide, and a right on the
part of children to receive, at least that legislatively defined "minimally adequate" level of education. Simultaneously, legislators have
withdrawn the shield against outside enforcement efforts (behind
which the courts long have hidden1 12) that education is a sacrosanct
matter of local concern hence inappropriate for state- or federal-level
review. 1 '
112

E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) ("No single tradition in public

education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local
autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and

support for public schools and to quality of the educational process."); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,49-50 (1973); Wright v. Council Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,
478 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
113

As expressed by President Bush and the 50 governors, the government has committed

itself to the fourfold proposition that: (1) a minimally adequate education is indeed definable in
terms of "the knowledge and skills required in an economy in which our citizens must be able
to think for a living" and measurable using "clear, national performance goals"; (2) "every
child can acquire th[at] knowledge and [those) skills"; (3) the state has a duty to provide "a

rigorous program of instruction designed to ensure" that children do so; and (4)
notwithstanding education's traditional place as a state responsibility, national standards are
now required, as is a renewed commitment by the federal government to funding educational
"services for young people most at risk." Jeffersonian Compact, supra note 97, at E22, col. 2,

3, 5 (emphasis added); accord enactments and commentary quoted infra notes 122-23 and
accompanying text. On the weakening of local control over the schools, see Anderson &
Pipho, State-Mandated Testing and the Fate of Local Control, 66 Phi Delta Kappan 209

(1984); Doyle & Finn, American Schools and the Future of Local Control, 77 Pub. Interest 77
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Relying on the favored status of educational redistribution in this
nation's history and liberal ideology, therefore, this strategy first identifies as the codified political consensus of the community that formal
educational equality-"equal access"-does not suffice and that a
kind of substantive equality-"equal chances"-is also required;1 14
the strategy then seeks to enforce this conclusion judicially. 1 I5
A.

An Illustration, an Intuition, and an Initial Policy and Legal

Inquiry
Lawyers and courts traditionally have provided redress for citizens
who are legally owed unliquidated duties by public officials.1 16 The

crux of the strategy explored here is that minimum-performance standards for schools and students create just such legally enforceable
duties. Before supporting this conclusion with technical legal analy(1984); Raywid, supra note 99; Cohen, supra note 93, at 20, col. 3 (" 'weakening of localism'
. . (precipitated]
[
by technological advancements and a more geographically mobile
population"); Johnson, supra note 96, at 24, col. 1 (quoting statement of Albert Shanker,
president of the American Federation of Teachers, contrasting President Bush's endorsement
of national educational standards with tendency of prior Administrations to "steer[ ] clear
away from anything that might have smacked of local curriculum control or anything like
that"); Walker, 2 Kentucky Districts Deemed "Deficient," Face State Takeover, Educ. Week,
Jan. 18, 1989, at 1; Arkansas Accountability Plan Could Force District Mergers, Educ. Week,
Jan. 18, 1989, at 9, col. 5; infra note 174.
114 By equal access, I mean the removal of extrinsic barriers to. educational attainment; by
equal chances, I mean, in addition, the removal of the social contingencies affecting
educational attainment.
1151 say a "kind" of substantive equality because the strategy I describe here does not
attempt to enforce more controversial versions of substantive educational equality, namely,
"equal ability" (natural contingencies affecting educational attainment also removed) or
"equal outcomes" (motivational contingencies also removed). See J. Dewey, supra note 87, at
24 (arguing that schooling should ensure "that each individual gets an opportunity to escape
from the limitations of the social group in which he was born"); id. at 97 (arguing that
democratic society must provide citizens with schooling "of such amplitude and efficiency as
will in fact and not simply in name discount the effects of economic inequalities"); J. Rawls,
supra note 57, at 73 (defining "principle of fair equality of opportunity" as providing that
"those who are at the same level of talent and ability and have the same willingness to use
them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social
system"); cf. B. Ackerman, supra note 87, at 26-28, 139-67 (implying that a just liberal state
must afford all children an education sufficient to answer claims that uneven family,
developmental, and genetic backgrounds undermine the equality of citizens).
116 E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803); infra notes 177-85 and
accompanying text; see W. Gellhorn, C. Byse, P. Strauss, T. Rakoff & R. Schotland,
Administrative Law 985-1081 (8th ed. 1987) [hereinafter W. Gellhorn].
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117
sis, let me first appeal to intuition by using an illustration.
New York law now requires that elementary and secondary school
officials administer reading and mathematics tests at the third, sixth,
eighth-ninth, and tenth-eleventh grade levels. The tests are designed
to assess whether students have achieved minimum mastery over
those subjects and, eventually, to determine eligibility for a diploma.
Below-standard student performance on the tests automatically triggers remedial assistance, which is explicitly required to afford lowscoring students the skills needed to pass similar tests administered
later in their school careers, including the final tests that control eligibility for a diploma." 8 In a number of New York City schools,
upwards of half of the children taking the third grade tests fall below
the state benchmark, 1 9 following which either no remedial help is
provided or the remedial plans that are implemented fail to enable
most of the previously below-standard children to score at or above
standard on the sixth grade, junior high, and high school versions of

117 This illustration draws upon minimum-standards enactments in New York and
educational conditions in New York City. Those enactments and conditions are similar to
ones in other states and urban areas in the nation. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
118 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, §§ 100.2(e), 100.3(b)(3), 100.4(f)(2), 100.5(a)(4)(iv)
(1989).
119Fifty-two, 58, 59, and 61% of the high school students taking the Regents Competency

Test in January, 1987, in the boroughs of Queens, Bronx, Manhattan, and Brooklyn,
respectively, fell below the state reference point for diplomas. Div. of Educ. Testing, N.Y.
State Educ. Dep't, State Tests and High School Graduation Reference Group Summaries:
October 1987, tables 1 and 2. In New York City, 42% of third graders and 41% of sixth
graders fell below state reference point on reading tests administered in the Spring of 1985;
statewide, the corresponding figures were 21 and 20%. Div. of Educ. Testing, N.Y. State
Educ. Dep't, State Tests and High School Graduation Reference Group Summaries: 1985-86
School Year, table 1. A comparison of the percentage of elementary "schools in need of
assistance" (schools reporting mean test scores and other data placing them in the lowestperforming 10% of schools in the state), which ranges from 0% in an upper middle-class
subdistrict in Queens to 100% in some predominantly poor and minority subdistricts in
Brooklyn and Manhattan, reveals the high concentration of low-scoring students in certain
schools and subdistricts in the New York City District. Div. of Educ. Testing, N.Y. State
Educ. Dep't, 1985 Comprehensive Assessment Report; see also Verhovek, supra note 102, at
B1, col. 1 (39 of 43 most academically troubled schools in New York are in the New York City
school district). Similarly, in Hartford, Connecticut, fully 70, 59, and 57% of the district's
children recently fell below the state's legislatively mandated remedial benchmark on fourth,
sixth, and eighth grade reading tests (compared to typically 10-20% of the children in adjacent
suburban districts). Likewise, 41, 42, and 57% of Hartford's children fell below the state's
remedial benchmark on fourth, sixth, and eighth grade mathematics tests (compared to
typically 3-15% of the children in adjacent suburban districts). Complaint at 13-14, Scheff v.
O'Neill (Hartford/New Britain Super. Ct. filed Apr. 26, 1989).
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the same tests. 120
To lay persons and to lawyers it intuitively seems fair to say that
school officials have broken a promise to students-namely, to provide them with a minimally adequate education in reading and mathematics or, more specifically, to provide them with sufficient
educational resources to enable them to master the material on the
state-mandated tests. 2 This intuition finds considerable support in
New York's minimum-standards regulations that, according to the
commentary accompanying them, give "[e]very student in the State
...

an assurance of State quality control in education," "provide each

student the opportunity to reach or exceed [state-mandated] standards and requirements," and assure that "differences in results [are
not] the products of prejudice or discrimination."' 122 Indeed, the reg120 This conclusion is based upon interviews of community school district superintendents,
principals, teachers, legal aid attorneys, other community and policy advocates, and
educational experts in New York City conducted by the Minimally Adequate Education
Group of the Columbia University School of Law Education Law Project during the 1987
Spring term. See also Watchdog Group Calls Remediation Inadequate in New York City,
Educ. Week, Nov. 22, 1989, at 2, col. 5 (study showing, inter alia, that more than 40% of
fourth graders in New York City's public schools who are entitled to receive remedial services
based on their third grade mathematics test scores do not receive such services and also
documenting the use of unqualified instructors to provide those remedial services that are
available).
121 Emblematic of the intent and effect of minimum-standards legislation to create
accountability on the part of test-givers as well as test-takers is the following statement by
Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas about the Jeffersonian Compact on Education that the
President and governors signed recently:
This is the first time a President and governors have ever stood before the American
people and said: "Not only are we going to set national performance goals, which are
ambitious, not only are we going to develop strategies to achieve them, but we stand
here before you and tell you we expect to be held personally accountable for the
progress we make in moving this country to a brighter future.. .. "
Miller, Summit's Promise: "Social Compact" for Reforms, Educ. Week, Oct. 4, 1989, at I. On
the importance of respecting expectations generated by statutory norms and the "demoralization" costs that accompany government frustration of such expectation, see J. Mashaw, Due
Process in the Administrative State 122-23 (1985); Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive
Rights, in Due Process, Nomos XVIII, at 192-94 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
122 Regents Action Plan, supra note 95, at 2, 4; accord id. at 2 ("the goals, objectives,
standards and requirements of our plan apply to all students"). Similarly, the Connecticut
State Department of Education stated that its goal of "'[e]qual educational opportunity'
means student access to a level and quality of programs and experiences which provide each
child with the means to achieve a commonly defined standard of an educated citizen,"
"require[s] resource allocations based upon individual student needs and sufficient resources to
provide each child with opportunities for developing his or her intellectual abilities and special
talents," and is evidenced by "the participation of each student in programs appropriate to his
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ulations themselves state that each school district "shall offer students
attending its schools the opportunity to meet all [including the testing] requirements for and receive a Regents High School Diploma"
and that "students who score below the designated state reference
point on [state-mandated tests] shall be provided appropriate remedial
instruction designed to enable them to score above the State reference
point on the corresponding" test given later in the students' educa-

tional careers. 123 This initial intuition is informed, finally, by the
unreasonableness-particularly given the role of public education in
liberal polities"E4-- of a legal system that forces children to attend
school, requires them to take tests covering materials they cannot
master on their own, fails to assist them in mastering the materials,
then penalizes them for failing to do so.' 25
The intuitive appeal of viewing the new standards as creating
enforceable rights and duties is immediately challenged by a number
of legal and policy questions: Particularly in an era of strict statutory
interpretation, are judges likely-and should they be encouraged-to
interpret every expression of aspirational educational policy as an
or her needs and the achievement by each of the state's student sub-populations (as defined by
such factors as wealth, race, sex or residence) of educational outcomes at least equal to that of
the state's student population as a whole." Conn. State Bd. of Educ., Policy Statement on
Equal Educational Opportunity I (adopted May 7, 1986) (attached to Circular Letter C-15,
Series 1986-1987, from Gerald N. Tirozzi, Commissioner of Education, to Superintendents of
Schools (Oct. 27, 1986)). Although New York's regulations do not say so, I am assuming they
apply only to students not properly determined to be functionally mentally handicapped and
hence outside the range of normal intellectual ability, see Board of Educ. v. Ambach, 90
A.D.2d 227, 458 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1982), aff'd mem., 60 N.Y.2d 758, 457 N.E.2d 775, 469
N.Y.S.2d 669 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984), and my discussion here likewise is
only intended to apply to such students. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Ambach.
123N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, §§ 100.2(e), 100.3(b)(3) (1989) (emphasis added);
see also Conn. State Bd. of Educ., supra note 122, at 3 (providing that "[a]Il students will
receive such remedial education services as are appropriate to their needs").
124See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
125See Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979), affd in part, vacated in
part, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that combination of mandatory-attendance and
mandatory-testing laws creates duty to provide all students with instruction sufficient to
acquaint them with material covered on state-mandated tests); infra notes 192-208 and
accompanying text; see also Note, Educational Malpractice and a Right to Education: Should
Compulsory Education Laws Require a Quid Pro Quo?, 21 Washburn L.J. 555, 568 (1982)
(arguing, citing Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), that students deprived of liberty to forgo attending
school deserve quid pro quo of minimally adequate education just as courts have concluded
that mental patients involuntarily deprived of liberty are entitled to quid pro quo of treatment).
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enforceable commitment to effectuate that policy? Is it reasonable to
suppose-and is it wise to invite judges to rule-that legislators, by
promulgating minimum-standards laws, intended to redistribute substantial resources from citizens who do not have underachieving children in the public schools to citizens who do and from other projects
of public concern to public instruction? Even if so, will plaintiffs be
able to establish causal links between breaches of duties and educational underachievement, notwithstanding the myriad organic and
sociological factors that contribute to educational outcomes? If so,
are adequate educational remedies available? And, if so, will those
remedies be of a "separate but equal" sort that only perversely can be
called mechanisms for implementing "Brown"?
The answers to these questions depend largely upon highly contextualized analyses of the particular legal theories being utilized to
enforce minimum standards and the particular standards being
enforced. 26 To facilitate such analyses, the next four Sections
examine a number of potential legal theories and a number of common statutory educational-performance standards. The remainder of
this Section offers some initial, more broadly gauged answers to these
questions.
1.

Duty

Two perspectives on the question whether minimum-standards
laws do and ought to create enforceable duties interest me here-that
of someone concerned with fostering competent and democratically
legitimate decisionmaking on matters of public policy 127 and that of
potential plaintiffs. Considered from both perspectives, there is reason to think that principled legal conclusions will lead to desirable
policy outcomes. Put differently, the questions the governing legal
doctrines require courts to answer affirmatively as a matter of law
before a duty is inferred appear to be the same questions that the persons whose perspectives I have identified would want answered
126 The needs and educational deficits of the particular client populations being served and
the capacities of and competing demands on the particular educational systems and political
jurisdictions being scrutinized also may bear heavily on the answers to these questions, but are
beyond the scope of this Article.
127 Taking this policy perspective allows me to test the proposed strategy's capacity to take
advantage of the majoritarian impulse discussed supra notes 108-11. In Section E infra, I
examine the proposed strategy from a different, educationally focused, policy perspective.
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affirmatively as a matter of policy and practice before a duty is
imposed.
From the policy analyst's perspective, the duty-defining aspect of
the proposed strategy poses two dangers: First, the strategy might put
legislators to an undesirable choice between, on the one hand, not
acting at all to improve education or to acknowledge the need for
improvement (legislators might, for example, eschew or repeal minimum-standards laws) and, on the other hand, committing educational
officials to solving all the state's educational problems at once on pain
of judicial scrutiny and control if the officials fail. Second, the strategy might assign to the courts-an authority arguably lacking in competence and legitimacy-the task of redistributing resources between
different groups of citizens and between competing projects of public
concern on the basis of fuzzy legal standards of the courts' invention. 28 Both hazards reflect the possibility that implementing the
proposed strategy would shift flexibility and control in regard to matters of public policy from authorities who are relatively more
demo29
cratic and expert to authorities who are relatively less so.'
Undoubtedly, a court's recognition and enforcement of a legal duty
on the part of the state can curb substantially the flexibility and control exercised by state officials in the affected sphere of activity. As
discussed in more detail in the next three Sections, however, the doctrines that determine whether a legally enforceable duty exists are
designed, in theory at least, to divert judicial attention away from
what judges think is good policy, and even from what judges think the
framers of a constitution thought was good policy decades or centuries ago. The doctrines focus judicial attention instead on what a
political majority thought was good policy when it recently spoke on
the matter through its representatives. In theory, that is, every decre128 See, e.g., D. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 10-12, 167-69 (1977); J. Mashaw,
supra note 121, at 260-64; Diver, The Judge as Political Pawnbroker: Superintending
Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 Va. L. Rev. 43, 69-70 (1979); Elson, A Common
Law Remedy for Educational Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 641, 646 (1978); Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the
Burger Court, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 45-48 & nn.234, 236-37 (1978).
129 Just how much more democratic and expert legislatures are than courts is subject to
considerable dispute. E.g., M. Rebell & A. Block, Educational Policymaking and the Courts

205-15 (1982); Cavanagh & Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a
Jurisprudence of Judicial Competence,

Chemerinsky, supra note 108, at 77-87.

14 L. & Soc. Rev. 371, 373, 411-14 (1980);

1990]

Implementing Brown

ment in legislative control and every increment in judicial authority
caused by the recognition of a statutorily created duty-as well as the
resulting redistribution of resources--depends upon the more democratic and expert body's constantly revisable choice thus to limit and
bind itself, thus to empower the less democratic and expert body, and
thus to allocate resources.
At best, therefore, the contemplated enforcement strategy may be
seen as contingent upon a judicial finding that the legislature intentionally, or at least advertently, delegated responsibility to the courts
30
to help enforce the public policies that a political majority adopted.1
There is no obvious reason, moreover, why legislatively endorsed judicial enforcement mechanisms are democratically illegitimate. Indeed,
to the extent that specificity and clarity in the directives legislators
give to enforcement authorities enhance democratic control,13 1 judi-

cial enforcement is more democratically legitimate than administrative enforcement mechanisms. For courts insist upon greater
legislative specificity and clarity before recognizing and executing legislative "delegations" to themselves than they demand before allowing
administrative bodies to recognize and execute delegations to those

bodies. 132 Similarly, the existence of judicial enforcement techniques
increases rather than interferes with legislative flexibility.
At worst, the contemplated strategy's viability from a policy standpoint depends upon the assumption-not, I think, unreasonable-that
the use of judicial as well as political devices to hold legislators to
what they and their constituents legitimately understood at the time
130 By advertent as opposed to intentional delegations, I refer to laws that legislators did not
specifically design to trigger judicial enforcement but which the legislators had reason to
expect would do so.
131 See, e.g., J. Ely, supra note 56, at 131-34 (advocating a revitalization of the
nondelegation doctrine on the ground that legislative specificity and clarity increase "the sort
of accountability that is crucial to the intelligible functioning of a democratic republic").
132 Compare infra notes 176-208 and accompanying text (relatively high degree of
legislative specificity and clarity upon which courts insist before recognizing enforceable duties
and entitlements in mandamus and procedural due process actions) with J. Ely, supra note 56,
at 132-33 (demise of nondelegation doctrine in judicial review of agency action pursuant to
open-ended grants of legislative power) and Chevron v. Natural Resources Dev. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 842-43, 865-66 (1984) (in certain circumstances, administrative agencies have wider
latitude in interpreting vague statutory language than do federal courts). At the very least, the
nondelegation-type constraints that courts impose on themselves but not on administrative
agencies neutralize the democratic advantage that administrative enforcement mechanisms
might otherwise be thought to have over judicial enforcement mechanisms. See infra note 171.
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to be promises does not substantially interfere with and probably
serves the policies favoring competent and democratic decisionmaking. 133 In sum, there is no evident reason to expect that conscientious
judicial application of the legal doctrines governing the identification
of public duties will frustrate, and there is some reason to hope that it
will facilitate, democratic policies.
From the perspective of potential plaintiff schoolchildren and their
lawyers, this discussion raises the question of why resources should be
expended to enforce legal duties that, particularly after being
enforced, are at great risk of being legislatively devalued or revoked.
My answer to this question is that sound judgments about the strategy's prospects for legal success ought to serve as reasonably good
predictors of the likelihood that the plaintiff children actually will
benefit if the strategy does succeed legally.
Poor and minority children have the greatest incentive to enforce
minimum standards in theirfavor when those standards otherwise are
likely to be used againstthem by, for example, occasioning a denial of
matriculation, graduation, or college attendance. Assume, as I argue
elsewhere, that the attachment of such negative consequences to a
child's failure to meet minimum standards enhances the likelihood
under existing doctrine that a court will recognize a duty on officials'
part to provide the child with the means to meet the standards. 34 In
that event, the child's incentive to enforce the standards actually is
increased by the possibility that enforcement will lead the legislature
to devalue or repeal the duty by moderating or abandoning the negative consequences triggered by a failure to meet the standards. Again,
the stronger is the legal case for inferring a duty, the stronger are the
pragmatic reasons in favor of seeking to have a duty inferred, even at
133See, e.g., J. Mashaw, supra note 121, at 219-20; Easterbrook, Substance and Due
Process, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 85; Grey, supra note 121, at 192-94; infra notes 193-94, 213 and
accompanying text (link between Supreme Court's majoritarianism and its "positivist"
approach to "property" rights). The democratic bona fides of judicially enforcing statutorily
created entitlements clearly encompass the legal theories developed below that either (1)
directly enforce substantive statutory norms, (2) use statutory norms to inform constitutional
norms, or (3) protect citizens' statutorily generated expectations by enforcing procedural
requirements expressed or implied in the relevant statutes. Regarding the democratic bona
fides of theories that protect citizens' statutorily generated expectations by substituting

judicially for legislatively specified procedures, see infra note 214.
134 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text; infra notes 192-209, 287-89 and

accompanying text.
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the risk of causing the legislature to modify the statutory traits based
on which the duty was inferred.
Even when children suffer no negative consequences if they fail to
satisfy minimum standards, the strength of the legal case for inferring
a duty-the strength of the evidence that the legislature in effect
promised that public instruction would enable children, with reasonable effort, to satisfy the standards-is likely to be commensurate with
the strength of the political consensus in favor of providing children
with the means to do so. It seems probable, that is, that unless one or
both of the following circumstances was present, politicians would not
have made what reasonably could be interpreted as binding promises
of a sort that are difficult to fulfill and subject to objective determination of whether they have been fulfilled: Either the public must have
insisted upon such promises in lieu of expressions of aspiration, or the
legislators must have concluded that their promises bound actors
other than themselves whose failure would not politically disadvantage the legislators.135 If one of these circumstances did accompany
adoption of the duty-creating law, moreover, legislators are likely to
have either a political disincentive or at least no particular incentive
to repeal the law after a court relies on it to infer a duty. Accordingly, subject to numerous instance-specific factors, there is reason to
believe that the strength of the plaintiffs' legal case in favor of recognizing a duty will be roughly commensurate with the likelihood that
the duty will survive its recognition. Just how strong the plaintiffs'
legal case in favor of recognizing a duty is likely to be is the question
taken up in Sections B-D below.
2.

Causation

Assuming that courts can infer duties from statutory minimum
educational-performance standards, can they also link individual students' educational deficits to breaches of those duties and thereby discount the claim of organic or sociological causes? Is it wise, by so
doing, to encourage the public in general and educationally deprived
135 Below, I consider the possibility that the proposed strategy unwisely seeks to enforce
duty-creating minimum-standards legislation that irresponsibly obliges administrative officials
to fulfill promises they are technologically unable to fulfill. See infra notes 141-64 and
accompanying text. On the willingness of legislators to impose unreasonable duties on
administrators and to make political capital out of the administrators' failure to abide by those
duties, see J. Ely, supra note 56, at 131-32.
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children in particular to see as "injustices" what otherwise might be
understood as simply irremediable "misfortunes" of birth or social
milieu? 136 Here, it seems to me, an authoritative holding that the legislature has established a duty to educate children also provides an
authoritative answer to the policy aspects of this causation question.
That answer, in turn, may ease the plaintiffs' burden in responding to
the legal aspects of the causation question.
Assume that the plaintiffs can show that not just a few but many or
most students in a given school fail tests not only on the first but also
on successive tries.1 37 We could treat this situation as reflecting the
failing children's "misfortune" of not having the intellectual or sociological means to "make it" on the tests. Or, we could treat it as
reflecting the "injustice" of being deprived of outcomes that the state
had the obligation to assure those children. When a court holds that
a minimum-standards law creates a duty to educate, that holding supports as well, it seems to me, a democratically legitimized presumption that the latter characterization is the proper one-that, absent
contrary proof by school officials, it is not the students' misfortune
but the officials' derogation of duty that accounts for the students'
failure to progress.
Notice, to begin with, how severely a duty-creating minimum-standards regime limits the excusatory explanations available to school
officials as a matter of policy and of law. Under prior-for example,
educational malpractice-regimes, school officials could abjure
responsibility (or negate the plaintiffs' charge of "injustice" with the
excuse of "misfortune") by showing that a given high school graduate's social milieu, rather than the schools he attended, "caused" him
(unfortunately, but not unjustly) to graduate as an illiterate. 13 In a
duty-creating minimum-standards regime, by contrast, school officials
136 See J. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (1989) (paper delivered at the Columbia University
Legal Theory Workshop, Jan. 29, 1990) (distinguishing "misfortune" and "injustice").
137 See supra note 119.
138 E.g., Donohue v. Copiague Unified Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 446, 391 N.E.2d

1352, 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (1979) (Wachtler, J., concurring) (agreeing with majority's
conclusion that proximate cause would be "difficult" to prove because "the student's attitude,

motivation, temperament, past experience, and home environment may all play an essential
and immeasurable role in learning"). See generally Elson, supra note 128, at 746-54
(proposing standards for proving causation of harm in educational malpractice suits). Within
"social milieu," I include such conditions as impoverishment, undernourishment, cultural
deprivation, limited English proficiency, lack of parental support, and the like.
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no longer can avail themselves of that legal defense-and the philosophical move it reflects-given the regime's democratically
embraced assumption that "each" and "[e]very student in the
State," 139 social milieu notwithstanding, can master the tested material. Nor, of course, can school officials challenge the validity of the
tests students use to document their educational deficiency inasmuch
as state lawmakers authoritatively have validated those tests for just
that purpose. The only excuse left school officials, therefore, is the
claim-which, it seems to me, is sufficiently unlikely to justify requiring school officials to prove it-that many or most students in the
school were individually unwilling to apply themselves conscientiously to mastering the material covered in the exams. To express
this conclusion in another way, once the state defines and holds its
educational personnel to minimum performance standards, it is reasonable to resolve questions of fault and causation with respect to
educational failures presumptively against the state whenever many
or most of the students in a school or district are initially, or at least
successively, unable to achieve state-mandated benchmarks on statemandated exams. 40
3. Remedy
The question of remedy remains: Does the relative ease with which
legislatures may be found to have created, school officials found to
have breached, and school children found to have been injured by the
breach of public duties merely reflect the ease with which legislators
irresponsibly may accumulate political capital by thrusting on administrative officials the "duty" to solve what in fact are insoluble social
problems? If so, enforcement efforts, however successful at the liability stage of litigation, will founder at the remedial stage. On the other
hand, if remedies for educational deficits among minorities attending
predominantly minority schools are available, are they not of a sepa139 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.

140Arkansas law, for example, creates a conclusive presumption that schools in which 15%
of the students fall below standard on state-mandated tests are failing schools, which must
participate in a state-mandated school-improvement program. See M. Goertz, supra note 95,
at 35; see also supra note 102 (similar provisions in New Jersey, New York, and a growing
body of additional states). All that is proposed here is a rebuttable presumption of school
failure based on high proportions of student failures.
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rate-but-equal sort that undercuts and surely does not implement
anew the holding of Brown?
The question whether viable remedies exist is primarily one of policy, not law.' 4 1 Given the possibility of irresponsible legislative buckpassing or breast-beating, 4 2 however, I do not argue here, as I did
above, that we should accept on faith what, by our duty-creating
143
hypothesis, is the legislature's affirmative answer to that question.
Nor does the answer "more money" suffice, as events in Connecticut recently have revealed. There, notwithstanding years of legally
successful finance-equity litigation, which substantially increased both
the state's proportion of educational expenditures and urban districts'
141Although the feasibility of alternative measures is relevant to whether a common law
duty of care has been breached, see Fed. R. Evid. 407; P. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D.
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 31, at 172, the probativeness of an
alternative-measures inquiry is partly or even wholly neutralized by a legislative specification of
the duty and the attributes of its breach. See id., § 36, at 227-33 (quoting St. Louis, Iron
Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1907)) (even if a defendant's violation of a
statute designed to protect a civil plaintiff from the type of injury received does not establish
negligence per se, it often provides strong evidence of negligence, in part because of the
legislative judgment that the defendant class "'can measurably control [the injury's]
causes' "); Note, Negligence and Breach of Statutory Duty, 4 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 429
(1984). Moreover, were an alternative-measures inquiry conducted, the courts would find that
the triumph of the Minimum-Standards Movement in the realm of politics drew explicit
support from the emergence of the Effective Schools Movement in the realm of educational
theory and practice. E.g., Regents Action Plan, supra note 95, at 2 (preface to New York's
minimum-standards regulations committing state to assuring "that proven characteristics of
effective schools are in place throughout our State"); see, e.g., Ratner, supra note 82, at 796808 (endorsing conclusions of Effective Schools advocates that the indicia of effective schools
are known and can be inexpensively replicated in poor and minority schools). Not
surprisingly, that is, the courts are likely to find ample evidence that legislators who enact
minimum-standards laws believe that the educational means exist to satisfy those standards.
In addition, school officials faced with statutory standards that apply to all children in the state
will find it legally and politically difficult to sustain a defense that, given existing educational
know-how, the children in their schools "cannot learn."
142The arguably twice democratically legitimated judgment that this nation, if it chose to
do so, could build a fail-safe strategic defense against nuclear attack presents a cautionary
example in this regard. Still, it would be unwise to deny the power of democratically endorsed
technological judgments-for example, that "America can land astronauts on the Moon by the
end of the decade"-to overcome legitimate scientific doubts.
143I do contend here, however, as I contend above, see supra notes 127-35 and
accompanying text, that the litigation decisions plaintiffs are likely to make based on their
assessments of available remedies are reasonably good proxies for the decisions neutral policy
analysts would make. Thus, minimum-standards litigation is sufficiently expensive and the
probability of success sufficiently uncertain that the absence of reasonably effective remedies
can be expected to tip the balance against bringing suit. See infra notes 270-75 and
accompanying text.
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per-capita expenditures on their predominantly minority students, 144
the performance of those students has remained depressingly low' 45
and has prompted both administrative and now litigative efforts to
achieve programmatic remedies. 46 Accordingly, although financial
equalization and enhancement has a role to play in improving educational outcomes, I am not prepared to rest a conclusion that sufficient
remedies exist on the possibility that substantially more money could
47
be spent on schools than is now being spent.
There are, however, programmatic remedies worth considering. To
begin with, there is a growing body of literature identifying educational interventions that appear to be more effective (and cost-effec48
tive) than interventions long in vogue in the nation's schools.
144 See Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Connecticut State Dep't of
Educ., Meeting the Challenge: Condition of Education in Connecticut 47-50 (1988-89)
(attributing to Horton lawsuit a 35% increase in proportion of public educational expenditures
in Connecticut supported by state funds). See generally Benson, State Government
Contributions to the Public Schools, in Public Schools: Issues in Budgetary and Financial
Management (J. Augenblick ed. 1985) (comparing states' contributions to local public
education).
145 See supra note 119.
146See Complaint at 19-24, Scheff v. O'Neill (Hartford/New Britain Super. Ct. filed Apr.
26, 1989) (describing recent administrative proposals to improve education of minority
children through voluntary integration efforts and alleging, inter alia, that state's failure to
implement proposals violates state and federal law); Committee on Racial Equity, A Report on
Racial/Ethnic Equity and Desegregation in Connecticut's Public Schools Prepared for
Presentation to the Connecticut State Board of Education (Jan. 1988) (report of committee
appointed by State Superintendent of Schools documenting the educational deficiencies of
predominantly minority schools in Connecticut and recommending voluntary statewide efforts
to achieve racial integration); Connecticut State Dep't of Educ., Quality and Integrated
Education: Options for Connecticut (Apr. 1989) (reaching similar conclusions and making
similar recommendations).
147See Miller, Study Puts U.S. Near Bottom on School Spending, Educ. Week, Jan. 24,
1990, at 1, col. 1 (discussing debate between Bush Administration and educational researchers
over the ranking of the United States among major industrial nations in terms of proportion of
its gross national product and income devoted to public elementary and secondary education
and reporting the findings of a recent report that rank the United States fourteenth among the
world's top 16 industrial powers in terms of proportion of national and per capita income
spent on precollegiate education).
148 E.g., P. Hill, A. Wise & L. Shapiro, Educational Progress: Cities Mobilize to Improve
Their Schools (Rand Corp. Center for the Study of the Teaching Profession, No. R-371 1-JSM/
cstp, Jan. 1989) [hereinafter P. Hill]; J. Oakes, Improving Inner-City Schools: Current
Directions in Urban District Reform (Center for Policy Research in Educ., No. JNE-02, Oct.
1987) (survey of new technologies); Quality Education for Minorities Project, Education that
Works: An Action Plan for the Education of Minorities (1989); Crain & Mahard, Minority
Achievement: Policy Implications of Research, in Effective Desegregation, supra note 45, at
55-70 (discussing effective uses of school desegregation to improve academic performance of
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Moreover, some of those interventions seem promising in an absolute
sense. "Effective schools" techniques provide one example.149
"School-based management" approaches, which have been used with
some impressionistically documented success in predominantly black
and Latino schools in East Harlem in New York City and in Miami,
provide another example. 150 To my mind, these educational interventions have not yet proven themselves sufficiently to justify imposing
on schools a common law duty to adopt them."' But they do hold
out enough promise to justify decisions by civil rights organizations to
expend resources seeking decrees that may prompt persistently unsuccessful schools to adopt those interventions in execution of a defaulted
legislative duty to educate.
As discussed earlier, moreover, there is one available intervention
1 52
that has proven itself for decades now-school desegregation.
Although the availability of desegregation as a remedy for race-based
equal protection violations is limited in the ways set out above,1 53
desegregation's availability as a remedy for the breach of a state's statutory duty to educate is less limited for a number of reasons. First,
the plaintiffs' burden of proof in minimum-standards litigation is different from that in race-based equal protection litigation and at times
minority children); Sharan, Cooperative Learning in Small Groups: Recent Methods and
Effects on Achievement, Attitudes, and Ethnic Relations, 50 Rev. Educ. Res. 241 (1980)
(describing success of "cooperative learning" techniques in improving academic performance
of minority children); Walberg, Improving the Productivity of American Schools, Educ.
Leadership, May 1984, at 19 (meta-analysis of effectiveness of various technologies).
149 See Ratner, supra note 82, at 796-808.
150 See W. Clune & P. White, School-Based Management: Institutional Variation,
Implementation, and Issues for Further Research (Center for Policy Research in Educ., No.
RR-008, Sept. 1988); J. David, Restructuring in Progress: Lessons from Pioneering Districts
(Nat'l Governors Ass'n 1989); P. White, Resource Materials on School-Based Management
(Center for Policy Research in Educ., No. RR-009, Sept. 1988).
151 See Cuban, Transforming the Frog into a Prince: Effective Schools Research, Policy, and
Practice, 54 Harv. Educ. Rev. 129 (1984) (disputing Effective Schools claims); Elson, Suing to
Make Schools Effective, or How to Make a Bad Situation Worse: A Response to Ratner, 63
Tex. L. Rev. 889, 890-93 (1985) (surveying literature questioning usefulness of Effective
Schools techniques); Walsh, SES, Academic Achievement, and Reorganization of
Metropolitan Area Schools: Preliminary Implications of the Milwaukee Area Study, 1 Metro.
Educ. 78, 88 (1986) (disappointing results of Effective Schools program in Milwaukee); cf.
Ratner, supra note 82 (arguing that Effective Schools techniques are so consistently successful
when properly implemented that a deficient school's or district's failure to implement those
techniques may constitute an actionable breach of a legally enforceable duty to educate).
152 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 31-34, 90-92 and accompanying text.

1990]

Implementing Brown

will be less onerous. 154 Second, the judicially constraining
countermajoritarian difficulty afflicting decrees ordering desegregation under the equal protection clause is partly avoided by decrees
ordering the same remedy based on duties derived from democratically adopted minimum-performance standards. Third, unlike in
traditional desegregation litigation, in which the violation usually
obliges judges to insist on racially integrative remedies, 155 the remedial order in the minimum-standards context is likely to consist of a
directive to school officials to choose their own remedy. 156 Should
those officials conclude-as the Connecticut Board of Education and
Superintendent of Schools recently concluded outside the context of
litigation' 57-- that desegregation is the best means of achieving the
standards that the state legislature imposed, then the
countermajoritarian difficulty evaporates almost entirely. 158 Fourth,
as a practical matter, any desegregation remedy that public officials
select will have to be so suffused with voluntary options and incentives that the "forced busing" complaint that has proved so troublesome in old-style desegregation cases will not apply.15 9 Fifth, if the
state department of education is among the agencies ordered to
redress a breach of a statutory duty to educate, and if that agency, as
is increasingly the case, has the ability to reorganize school districts or
attendance patterns in the state,1 60 the defendants will be able to
achieve far more meaningful desegregation, drawing upon statewide
pools of white and minority students, than the courts have been able
to achieve drawing upon districtwide or, at best, metropolitanwide
pools of students.
154 Compare supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text with infra notes 166-275 and
accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
156 See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
157 See Committee on Racial Equity, supra note 146; Connecticut State Dep't of Educ.,

supra note 146.
158 Consider also the recent decision of the Seattle Board of Education to continue the
operation of that city's voluntary desegregation plan and the city voters' subsequent approval
by a four-to-one margin of a levy proposal needed to continue funding at existing levels. See
Seattle Voters Approve Levy; Board Backs Plan for Minorities, Educ. Week, Feb. 14, 1990, at
2, col. 3; Seattle Board Votes to Reject Controversial Anti-Busing Measure, Educ. Week, Jan.
16, 1990, at 5, col. 5.
159 See initiatives discussed supra notes 146, 157, 158.
160 See Newman, School Consolidation Garnering Legislators' Attention, Educ. Week, Jan.
10, 1990, at 15, col. 1.
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The availability of racially integrative remedies also weakens the
claim that the new strategy undermines the old one by favoring separate-but-equal remedies. Even when liable defendants shun integration in favor of segregation-maintaining remedies, moreover, the new
strategy remains consistent with the old one. Thus, the new strategy
is not designed to replace but only to supplement the old one when
directly integrative options are unavailable. In addition, the old strategy not only constrains, but its renewed use might be occasioned by,
liable defendants' responses to the new strategy. For the old strategy
forbids defendants to forgo proven integrative remedies in favor of
unproven nonintegrative techniques unless the defendants have a
legitimate-that is to say, nonracial-reason for doing so. 16 1 Finally,
from the historical perspective adopted above, 16 2 not to mention the
perspective of numerous scholars and some of the architects of
Brown,163 that decision is as much about enhanced educational opportunity as it is about integration, so that a strategy that pursues the
former when the capacity to achieve the latter has been exhausted is
not inharmonious with Brown.
Where integrative remedies are demographically and politically
possible,"6 remedial questions pose no obstacle to the proposed strategy's success. Otherwise, the strategy's viability depends upon two
factors: the willingness of civil rights organizations to devote substantial litigative resources to experiments with such promising but as yet
unproven educational interventions as effective schools and schoolbased management, and the outcomes of the large-scale experiments
with those techniques that now are taking place in New York, Miami,
165
Chicago, Milwaukee, Kansas City, San Diego, and elsewhere.
161See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1979); Arthur v.
Nyquist 573 F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573
F.2d 400, 413 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978).
162See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.

163 Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation Plan, in Shades of Brown: New Perspectives on
School Desegregation, supra note 50, at 124; Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in id.
at 20; Fiss, supra note 49.
164See, e.g., supra notes 157 and 158.

165 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 33-34 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (effective schools
component of school desegregation remedy in Kansas City), affd on this ground, 807 F.2d 657
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 708 (1987); J. David, supra note 150 (discussing
school-based management initiatives in Cincinnati, Miami, New York, Rochester, and Santa

Fe); P. White, supra note 150, at 5-24 (school-based management initiatives in Miami, San
Diego and 98 other districts in the United States and Canada); Fernandez, The Chancellor's
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Whenever existing legal doctrine recognizes a legislatively created
duty based on a statutory minimum educational-performance standard, there is reason to believe that democratic policy and the needs of
the putative plaintiffs would be served by that recognition, that
breaches of those duties could and ought to be identified and causally
linked to the failure of large proportions of children in identifiable
schools and districts to satisfy the standards, and that remedies for
such breaches exist. The decisive question, therefore, is whether
existing legal doctrine will recognize legislatively created duties with
sufficient frequency to justify a strategy based on the intuition that
they do.
The discussion that follows briefly sketches a number of legal arguments that might be deployed in order to enforce judicially this intuition, should informal and nonlegal enforcement efforts fail. Possible
legal and policy objections to enforcement efforts premised on each of
the arguments also are briefly addressed.
B. Statutory Actions to Enforce Minimum-StandardsLegislation
Directly
1. Administrative Enforcement Actions
In New York, as in other states, the chief executive officer of the
department of education (in New York, the Commissioner) is statutorily empowered, subject to judicial review, to order local school personnel to cease improper conduct or to take action required by law.' 66
The only exceptions to the Commissioner's power involve claims
Budget Request for 1990-91, at 16-20 (New York City's newly proposed school-based
management/shared decisionmaking plan); Walsh, supra note 141 (Milwaukee's Effective
Schools program); Snider, Milwaukee to Decentralize Management of Schools, Educ. Week,
Feb. 8, 1989, at 7, col. 2; Lawmakers Pass Bill to Revamp Chicago Schools, Educ. Week, Dec.
7, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (Chicago's radical school-based management initiative).
166 N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 310, 311 (McKinney 1990). Section 310 authorizes the
Commissioner to resolve petitions by persons aggrieved by "any... official act or decision of

any officer, school authorities, or meetings concerning any ... matter under [the Education
Law], or any other act pertaining to common schools." Id. § 310(7); see also N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, §§ 275.1-.17 (1989) (procedural regulations). The Commissioner has
broad authority to review determinations made by local education officials throughout the

state, see, e.g., James v. Board of Educ., 42 N.Y.2d 357, 366 N.E.2d 1291, 397 N.Y.S.2d 934
(1977), is not bound by the factual findings of local school officials, Shurgin v. Ambach, 56
N.Y.2d 700, 436 N.E.2d 1324, 451 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1982), and may substitute his discretionary
judgment for that of the school official being reviewed even if the latter's actions were not
arbitrary; see, e.g., Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77, cert.
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based on pure questions of law or on a novel constitutional theory, as
167
to which the courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
In New York, therefore, parents aggrieved by a school's failure to
enable many or most of their children to pass state-mandated tests
initially, to receive "appropriate" remedial services upon falling below
standard, or, following remedial services, to pass the tests on a second
or subsequent try may have a tenable legal basis for an order from the
Commissioner enforcing the state's minimum-standards laws. The
Commissioner arguably could act, for example, by finding that local
and state school officials are not providing, then directing them to
provide any of the following: (1) an education sufficient to enable all
students in the school, upon reasonable effort, to meet the state stan169
dards; 168 (2) remedial services for students falling below standard;
denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 36 A.D.2d 199, 319 N.Y.S.2d 661
(1971).
The Commissioner's legal determinations-including those interpreting administrative
regulations, such as New York's minimum-education standards, and prior Commissioner's
rulings-are reviewable de novo, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 48 N.Y.2d 97, 397
N.E.2d 365, 421 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1979) (withholding of pay from suspended teacher reviewable
de novo); Board of Educ. v. Ambach, 90 A.D.2d 227, 458 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1982) (minimumcompetency regulations reviewable de novo); Verbanic v. Nyquist, 73 Misc. 2d 357, 397
N.Y.S.2d 949 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (de novo review of Commissioner's decision to vest an
overseer with absolute power over elected board of education); In re Van Allen v. McClearly,
27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (de novo review of refusal to allow
parents to inspect son's school records), fact determinations are reviewable for "substantial
evidence," N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 7803(4) (McKinney 1981); see, e.g., Pell v. Board of
Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 313 N.E.2d 321, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1974), and educational policy
determinations are reviewable under an "arbitrary and capricious" or equivalent standard; see,
e.g., Ward v. Nyquist, 43 N.Y.2d 57, 371 N.E.2d 477, 400 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1977); James v.
Board of Educ., 42 N.Y.2d 357, 366 N.E.2d 1291, 397 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1977); Board of Educ. v.
Board of Educ., 80 A.D.2d 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1981).
167 See, e.g., Sikora v. Board of Educ., 51 A.D.2d 135, 380 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1976) (teacher's
claim based on violation of constitutional rights of free speech and assembly); Lezette v. Board
of Educ., 43 A.D.2d 755, 350 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1973) (claim that school violated law), order
modified, 35 N.Y.2d 272, 319 N.E.2d 189, 360 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1974); Community Bd. v.
Scribner, 78 Misc. 2d 195, 356 N.Y.S.2d 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (case involving "single
question of law"); cf. Guglielmo v. Long Island Lighting Co., 83 A.D.2d 481, 445 N.Y.S.2d
177 (1981) (holding that cases raising only novel statutory or constitutional questions must
commence in the state courts, but, via "primary jurisdiction" procedure, may be stayed
pending action by the Commissioner to consider subsidiary factual or policy questions that
require or may benefit from the administrator's special expertise).
168 Regents Action Plan, supra note 95, at 2 (interpreting minimum-standards regulations
to require school officials to "provide each student the opportunity to reach or exceed [state7
mandated] standards and requirements").
169 See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 100.3(b)(3) (1989).
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or (3) "appropriate"remedial services for such students sufficient "to
enable them" upon reasonable effort "to score above the State reference point on the corresponding" test given later in the students' edu170
cational careers.

The advantage of administrative enforcement actions is that they
are presided over by educational specialists who are better placed than
judges to assure that any educational duties that are recognized are
meaningful. A court, for example, might feel doctrinally constrained
to distinguish the parts of a package of minimum-standards laws that

are clearly directive (for example, provisions requiring tests to be
given once a year and mandating remedial services for students failing
the tests) from parts of the package that are not so clearly directive
(for example, provisions that imply but do not specify that the remedial services must be educationally effective). By contrast, an administrative decisionmaker with the will to intervene might be more likely
to recognize the educational desirability of construing the entire package of laws as a cohesive set of duties (requiring, for example, that
instruction, tests, and remedial services be provided and be effective)
and might be more legitimately able to use the decisionmaker's wide
law-interpreting discretion to construe the legislation as imposing that
comprehensive "package" of duties.' 71
A principal disadvantage of administrative enforcement actions is

170 Id. (emphasis added). In addition to making any or all of the claims delineated above,
and basing those claims upon high failure rates on state-mandated tests, parents might allege,
and the Commissioner might conclude, that: (1) the educational or remedial services a school
offers are not properly geared to students' instructional needs; (2) the teaching staff or
leadership at the school is incapable; or (3) despite conscientious efforts at the school level,
students fail because district and state officials have not afforded the school sufficient resources
or technical assistance to enable it both to provide the remedial services it owes failing students
and to carry out its responsibilities toward the rest of its students.
171 See, e.g., Chevron v. Natural Resources Dev. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 865-66
(1984) (holding that judicial deference is due administrative interpretations of statutes as to
which the legislative intent is unclear because of the greater democratic legitimacy of
administrative than of judicial exercises of interpretive discretion); Grant v. Cuomo, 130
A.D.2d 154, 518 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1987) (similar); Pierce, Political Control Versus Impermissible
Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1990). But cf. Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1352, 523
N.Y.S.2d 464, 466 (1987) ("the scope of [an agency's] authority under.., statute must be
deemed limited by its role as an administrative, rather than legislative, body").
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their often unreasonable length and procedural unwieldiness. 17 2 If

that difficulty is not prohibitive in a particular state, the critical question is one of bureaucratic will. The recent politicization of the question of educational outcomes, together with the ongoing shift of
administrative control over education from localities to the state, 7 3
makes the likelihood of state-level intervention much greater in the
nineties than it was in decades past. Witness, for example, the recent
spate of sua sponte state takeovers of local school districts, which
were almost unheard of a decade ago. 7 4 Assuming that state officials

have the will to intervene at the local level, the question remains
whether they have the rarer will to share with local officials the
responsibility for remedying problems found to exist locally.
Although it is hard to imagine local educational failures that are not
due in part to a lack of state-level funding, oversight, and technical
assistance, the inclusion of state officials-including perhaps the state
Commissioner himself-as parties respondent in an action brought
before the Commissioner can be expected to decrease the likelihood of
175
the action's success.
As the state takeover cases reveal, however, a state educational

agency's acceptance of responsibility for identifying problems at the
local level, regardless of whether state responsibility for causing those
problems is acknowledged, creates its own imperative to assist in rem172 Consider, for example, the lengthy administrative litigation on the equalization of
educational financing in New Jersey. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part 1-The Structure of
Local Government, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 34-35 n.127 (1990).
173 See supra notes 93-97, 112-13 and accompanying text.
174 E.g., Berger, Chancellor Vows to Take Charge of Failing Schools in New York, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Snider, Cleveland School Officials Move to Avert State
Takeover, Educ. Week, Jan. 18, 1989, at 1, col. 5; Walsh, Citing Deficiencies, Georgia Board
Votes to Cut Off Funds to District, Educ. Week, Nov. 23, 1988, at 10, col. 1; N.J. First to
Attempt Complete Takeover, Educ. Week, June 1, 1988, at 12, col. 5 (discussing takeover
activities in five states); Jennings, New Jersey Moves to Take Control of School District, Educ.
Week, June 1, 1988, at 1, col. 2; supra note 113.
175 On the question whether the Commissioner might be disposed to make such findings and
orders with regard to the New York City schools, see Verhovek, Sobol Seeking To Dismantle
School Board, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1989, at B1, col. 6 (Commissioner criticizing quality of
education provided in New York City and supporting structural changes to remedy situation).
On the question whether state-level officials may bear some of the responsibility for the failure
of the New York City schools, see Daley, Regents Said to Neglect Problem Schools, N.Y.
Times, July 14, 1988, at B4, col. 1 ("The New York State Education Department has failed to
help New York City's public schools, focusing its resources on suburban and upstate districts
instead, a report made public yesterday by the State Comptroller said."); infra note 292.
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edying the problems that are identified. Moreover, once local officials
are named in an administrative complaint and particularly once liability against them is found, those officials will become important allies
in the petitioners' efforts to involve state officials in implementing
effective remedies. Accordingly, in the growing number of states that
have overcome the "local control" barrier to state intervention, sufficient oversight responsibility for local failures already may lie at the
state level to give state officials the will to intervene adjudicatively at
the local level and to contribute the state's resources to solving any
deficits that are found.
2. JudicialEnforcement Actions
If the Commissioner denies the relief sought by parents, or if the
parents believe that the relief sought falls within one of the "pure
law" or "novel law" situations in which judicial action is appropriate
in the first instance, the parents may seek judicial enforcement of the
duties they allege school officials have breached.' 7 6 In general, judi-

cial action is available to enforce any clear duty that an administrative
official or agency owes the plaintiff under the laws or regulations of
the state 177 but is not available to control mere exercises of administrative discretion that are not arbitrary and capricious. 178 The courts
have exercised their authority in this regard to compel agencies to
176Generally, if the parents' challenge is not based on purely or novel legal considerations, a
"final determination" requirement necessitates action by the Commissioner before judicial
review is appropriate. See Hamptons Hosp. & Medical Center v. Moore, 52 N.Y.2d 88, 417
N.E.2d 533, 436 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1981); see also supra note 166 (standards of review of
Commissioner's determinations).
177E.g., McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987);
Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 531, 463 N.E.2d 588, 590, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 249
(1984) (concluding that "if a statutory directive is mandatory, not precatory, it is within the
courts' competence to ascertain whether an administrative agency has satisfied the duty that
has been imposed on it... [and, if not,] to direct that the agency proceed forthwith to do so");
Dental Soc'y v. Carey, 61 N.Y.2d 330, 335, 462 N.E.2d 362, 364, 474 N.Y.S.2d 262, 264
(1984) ("Whether administrative action violates applicable statutes and regulations is a
question within the traditional competence of the courts to decide"); Levittown Union Free
School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 39, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 648 (1982);
Van Allen v. McCleary, 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (holding that
clear legal right may be established by the state constitution, state statutes, regulations of the
Commissioner, or even rulings and orders of the Commissioner).
178E.g., New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Employees v. Cuomo, 64
N.Y.2d 233, 475 N.E.2d 90, 485 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1984); Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380
N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978). See generally W. Gellhorn, supra note 116, at 989-92
(discussing the use of writs of mandamus to review administrative actions).
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perform statutorily mandated tasks, to require them to perform discretionary tasks necessary to implement a statutory scheme, 1 79 and to
determine whether actions taken by administrative agencies in
asserted conformity with their statutory duties in fact satisfy those
duties. 180
These principles almost certainly permit judicial enforcement of
school officials' obligations to administer mandated tests and to provide remedial services to students who score below standard. The regulations providing that "[s]tudents who score below the designated
State reference point on" a test "shallbe provided" remedial instruction "appropriate... to enable them to score above the State reference point on the [next] corresponding . . . test"18 ' also probably
create a justiciable claim that a school's failure to provide remedial
instruction techniques that enable many or most students to score at
1 82
or above standard abrogates the statutory mandate.
Under the same logic, regulations requiring schools to provide
every student with "the opportunity to meet all [including testing]
requirements for... a Regents high school diploma"1 83 and commentary to the regulations requiring schools to "provide each student the
opportunity to reach or exceed standards and requirements"' 8 4 also
might provide children attending failing schools-schools where
many or most students fail state-mandated tests-with a judicially
enforceable right to adequate education itself. Even if the courts are
unlikely themselves to create a right to a "minimally adequate education," or to supplant the appropriate administrator's discretion to
179E.g., Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 540, 463 N.E.2d 588, 596, 475 N.Y.S.2d
247, 255 (1984).
180E.g., McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 120, 511 N.E.2d 62, 66, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918, 923

(1987); Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 541, 463 N.E.2d 588, 596, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247,
255 (1984). Justiciability extends to any factual questions that determine whether a "clear
legal right" exists or has been breached. See Fehlhaber Corp. v. O'Hara, 53 A.D.2d 746, 384
N.Y.S.2d 270 (1976); Board of Educ. v. Levitt, 42 A.D.2d 372, 348 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1973).

181N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 100.3(b)(3) (1989) (emphasis added). The
narrative explanation of this regulation emphasizes its mandatory quality, stating that

"students scoring below State reference points on the [state-mandated] tests . . .must be
provided with remedial programs which prepare them to meet the Regents standards
successfully at the time of the next State-test
work." Regents Action Plan, supra note 95,
182 See authority cited supra note 180.
183 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs tit. 8, §
184 Regents Action Plan, supra note 95, at

level. Targeted state aid supports this remedial
at 3.

100.2(e) (1989).
2.
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interpret vague phrases such as that, they might be disposed to intervene once the legislative branch gives enforceable content to that
phrase by promulgating objective standards below which most of the
responsible agency's charges clearly and consistently fall.185
As noted, judicial enforcement efforts risk incompletely' successful
outcomes that might harm the plaintiffs (for example, by requiring
officials to administer stigmatizing tests but absolving them of any
duty to provide students with the means to pass the tests) or at least
might do the plaintiffs little or no good (for example, by giving students access to remedial services but denying them the right to insist
that the services be effective). Whether a particular court will be dis185 Compare Grant v. Cuomo, 130 A.D.2d 154, 518 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1987) (holding claim
that agency failed to provide preventive services to children "at risk" of foster care placement
as required by statute not justiciable because determination of who is at risk is within agency's
discretion), aff'd, 73 N.Y.2d 820, 534 N.E.2d 32, 537 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1988) with, e.g., McCain
v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 117, 511 N.E.2d 62, 64-65, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918, 921 (1987) (holding,
inter alia, that trial court properly concluded that statutory requirement of "emergency
housing" for homeless families with children implied duty to provide housing satisfying
"minimum standard" of habitability; that trial court properly enjoined Department of Social
Services to abide by court's interpretation of minimum standard until Department devised its
own; and that Department's adoption of minimum standard between lower court decision and
appeal did not render appeal moot because "[i]t is not the words of the standards, whether in
the injunction or the regulations, but compliance with them which will produce the minimally
adequate housing" necessary to comply with the statute) and Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61
N.Y.2d 525, 536-37, 463 N.E.2d 588, 593-94, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247, 252-53 (1984) (holding that
where administrator has clear legal duty to prepare adequate service and follow-up plans for
homeless mentally ill patients released from state psychiatric institutions, judicial review is
available to determine whether administrator's efforts to comply satisfied statute's adequacy
requirement) and Barnes v. Koch, 136 Misc. 2d 96, 100, 518 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1987) (holding that statutory entitlement to shelter necessarily includes the right to be
sheltered free of potentially significant health threats). Decisions holding that educational
programs mandated by state and federal education statutes must include components beyond
those actually specified in the enactments include Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974)
(interpreting the general language of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to require the
setting of standards for use in assessing the adequacy of educational programs for students not
proficient in English); Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Tex.
1981) (requirement that districts bear costs of handicapped children's educational needs
implicitly encompasses residential placement when necessary); Gary B. v. Cronin, 542 F.
Supp. 102 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("appropriate" education requires psychotherapy for mentally
handicapped children); Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.) (requirement
of "appropriate" educational services for handicapped children implies requirement of least
restrictive environment), afl'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); School
Comm. v. Commonwealth, [Decisions 1980-81] Educ. for the Handicapped L. Rep. (CRR)
552:186 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1980); M. McCarthy & P. Deignan, What Legally Constitutes an
Adequate Public Education 24, 26, 41 (Phi Delta Kappa Education Foundation 1982) (citing
other authority).
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posed to avoid such "incomplete" results and to recognize duties
based on less than absolutely directive statutory language may depend
in part on how the plaintiffs resolve the difficult strategic question of
whether to exhaust administrative remedies.186 On the one hand,
until the responsible administrator has been asked and has failed to
solve the problems alleged in the petitioners' complaint, a judge may
not consider the problems sufficiently intractable to warrant her intervention. On the other hand, an administrator's refusal to undertake a
solution to the problems on the ground that the governing law does
not create the duties the petitioners allege would decrease the
probability that a state court would recognize the asserted duties.
When timely and successful administrative enforcement efforts are
not a feasible possibility, these considerations place a premium on the
plaintiffs' ability to make a record of concerted informal efforts to
secure administrative redress and18on
the numerous case-specific fac7
below.
and
above
tors mentioned
3. Implied Private Right of Action
A less conventional but still possibly viable means by which parents
could enforce minimum-standards legislation directly is by asserting
an "implied private right of action" on behalf of their children under
the minimum-standards laws. To be allowed an implied private right
of action, the claimants must establish that they are members of a
distinct class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, that their injuries were proximately caused by the breach of the statute, and that the
remedy sought is not punitive 88or likely to impose undue burdens on
the government or taxpayers.1
In Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District,'89 a student
186The strategic exhaustion question arises only if no clear legal exhaustion requirement
exists. On the legal exhaustion question, see supra note 176.
187See supra note 126 and accompanying text; infra notes 271-75 and accompanying text.
188See, e.g., Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464, 356 A.2d 176 (1975); Knybel v. Kramer, 129

Conn. 439, 443, 29 A.2d 576, 577-78 (1942); Leger v. Kelley, 19 Conn. Supp. 167, 110 A.2d
635 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1954), afl'd, 142 Conn. 585, 116 A.2d 429 (1955); Bums, Jackson,
Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 324-25, 451 N.E.2d 459, 462-63, 464
N.Y.S.2d 712, 715-16, (1983); Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 54-55, 64 N.E.2d 704,
705-06 (1945); County of Monroe v. State, 123 A.D.2d 141, 511 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1987). See

generally Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (finding private cause of
action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972).
18964 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), afl'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418

N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
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who graduated from high school as a functional illiterate sued the
school district for "educational malpractice." The plaintiff argued,
among other things, that article XI, section 1 of the New York Constitution, which obligates the state to "maint[ain] and support ...

a

system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this State
may be educated," gave him an implied cause of action for breach of
duty on the part of the state to educate him. The New York courts
rejected the theory based upon the "well-established principle" that
"statutes which are not intended to protect [a specific class of individuals] against injury, but rather are designed to confer a benefit upon
the general public, do not give rise to a cause of action by an individual to recover damages for their breach." 190 By contrast to the general constitutional provision interpreted in Donohue, modem
minimum-standards legislation confers its benefits not simply on the
general public, but more specifically on "[e]very student in the
State. ' 191 The enactment of minimum-standards legislation, therefore, increases the body of law that might be taken by the courts to
create an implied right of action in students to sue for breaches of
statutorily created duties to educate them.
C. ConstitutionalActions to Enforce Minimum-Standards
Legislation Directly
Procedural due process analysis, premised on either federal or state
constitutional law, provides another basis for judicially enforcing
expectations expressly or impliedly created by minimum-standards
legislation. 192 This analysis requires courts to determine whether a
190 Id. at 37-38, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 880. But cf. Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464, 356 A.2d
176 (1975) (cause of action may be appropriate where statute protects general public and
plaintiff is a member of that class).
191Regents Action Plan, supra note 95, at 4; see supra note 122 and accompanying text
(listing the goals of New York's minimum-standards regime); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1014m (1989) (requiring districts to draft plans that: "[(a)] identifLy] individualstudent needs in
reading, language arts and mathematics skills; (b) provi[de] for remedial assistance to students
with identified needs; and (c) provi[de] for evaluating the effectiveness of the reading, language
arts and mathematics skills instructional program") (emphasis added).
192 Procedural due process theories have secured educational resources for handicapped
students seeking a basic public education, see, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp.
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), and, in limited circumstances, for students denied high school diplomas
because they failed to pass minimum competency tests, see, e.g., Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd.
of Educ., 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983), and the decisions discussed infra notes 196-201 and
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so-called "property interest"-a justifiable expectation that the government will provide particular citizens with a specified benefit under
particular circumstances-exists and, if so, what procedures governmental officials in fairness must afford affected citizens before depriving them of that benefit. States may create constitutionally protected
property interests either by enacting positive laws that mandate benefits 193 or by otherwise fostering a mutual understanding between
themselves and their citizens. 194 The "procedures that are due"
before the state may withhold a benefit to which a citizen claims to be
entitled are ones that meaningfully enable citizens-for example, via
notice and an opportunity to be heard-to demonstrate that they fall
within the class of persons whom state law intends to benefit. 195
Can it be argued, then, that students have a property interest, say,
in receiving a diploma and that among the procedures that are due
before the state may withdraw that benefit are instruction and remedial services sufficient to enable students applying reasonable effort to
pass the tests on which diplomas are in part predicated? A quick
sketch of some of the applicable case law suggests a basis for such an
argument.

accompanying text. The procedural due process literature is vast and generally disapproving
of current doctrine. See Terrell, Liberty and Responsibility in the Land of "New Property":
Exploring the Limits of Procedural Due Process, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 351, 352 n.1 (1987)
(collecting authority). The discussion here only touches upon these controversies, see infra
note 214, taking procedural due process doctrine as it exists.
193 See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Note, The Procedural Due Process Approach
to Administrative Discretion: The Courts' Inverted Analysis, 95 Yale L.J. 1017, 1018-19 &
nn.8-11 (1986) (citing authority); id. at 1019 (noting that "any form of governmental rule may
create an entitlement-even a policy statement promulgated by the very government officials
who apply it-[ifl it [is] mandatory"); cf. Student Roe v. Commonwealth, 638 F. Supp. 929
(E.D. Pa.) (finding no protected interest where statute defining gifted and talented program
stated that students with IQ scores below 130 "may" be admitted and where plaintiff scored
below 130), aft'd, 813 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987).
194 E.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (property interest in continued
employment); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza S., Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that
customary renewal of leases gave existing tenant right to renewed leases); Stoller v. College of
Medicine, 562 F. Supp. 403 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (property right to continued medical education),
aff'd mem., 727 F.2d 1101 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Note, supra note 193, at 1035 (noting that
the "very existence of a government program may encourage or even force private institutions
and individuals to rely on it").
195 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
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In Debra P. v. Turlington,9 6 federal trial and appellate courts concluded that Florida's mandatory-attendance statute had long created
a mutual expectation that students who completed prescribed coursework would graduate with a diploma. Next, they concluded that
Florida, by superimposing a minimum-competency test requirement
on the preexisting coursework requirement, had withheld state-created expectations from students who had completed their coursework
but did not pass the required test. 197 Having found that Florida
school officials had withheld a state-created property interest, the
appeals court addressed the question of what predeprivation process
was due. The court concluded that fairness demanded at least a modicum of what I would call "due educational procedures"-in this
case, that the tested material have been covered in classes available to
students denied diplomas because they failed to pass the test. 198
Board of Education v. Ambach' 99 involved a school district's
request that New York's new minimum-competency testing requirement for graduation be waived in the case of two "functionally" mentally handicapped students who had satisfied the coursework
requirements for graduation but could not pass the test. Rejecting as
"false" the district's premise that functionally handicapped students
"are capable of completing the requirements for graduating with a
diploma," the Appellate Division concluded that New York's testing
and graduation regulations did not afford such students a property
interest in a diploma because they could not have a reasonable expectation of passing the tests under any circumstances. 200 The court
went on to conclude, however, that the state's minimum-competency
regime does afford remedially handicapped (and, by implication, nonhandicapped) students a property interest in a diploma because such
196474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.
1981).
197Debra P., 644 F.2d at 404.
198 Id.; accord Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating
that school must expose handicapped students to material examined on minimum-competence
test before giving them the test); cf. Debra P. v. Turlington,-564 F. Supp. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1983)
(on remand, accepting state's proof that coursework available to plaintiffs covered materials on
tests and hence finding that due educational procedures had been provided), afftd, 730 F.2d
1405 (11 th Cir. 1984).
199 107 Misc. 2d 830, 436 N.Y.S.2d 564 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), modified, 90 A.D.2d 227, 458
N.Y.S.2d 680 (1982), affd, 60 N.Y.2d 758, 457 N.E.2d 775, 469 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984).
200 Ambach, 90 A.D.2d at 235-37, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87.
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students, with proper instruction, can meet, the requirements; hence,

the state may not deprive those students of a diploma without fair
educational procedures. °1
DebraP. and Ambach advance the "due educational process" analysis a fair distance. Both decisions establish that mandatory attendance laws and state regulations setting the requirements for

graduation and competency testing give students a protected property
interest in a high school diploma 2 2 that states withdraw when they
deny students diplomas for failure to pass such tests. Both cases also
recognize that the procedures constitutionally due before that deprivation may occur have educational components: At the least, before
school officials may deprive students of a diploma for failure to pass a
test, those officials must afford the students a course of study covering
the subject matter of the test and a reasonable amount of time before

201 Id. at 237, 241, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 686, 688. The court stated that due process in this
situation would be satisfied by three years' notice of the new testing regulation. Such notice,
the court concluded, would give the district and remedially handicapped students enough time
to design a program of study sufficient to enable the students to pass the test.
202 Accord Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (finding a property interest in receiving an
education based on state compulsory attendance law and statute directing local authorities to
provide education to all residents between five and 21 years of age); Mills v. Board of Educ.,
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the District of Columbia has a duty to educate
children with behavioral problems or mental handicaps); Pennsylvania Ass'n v.
Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that retarded students had a right
to an education once state had undertaken to provide education to other students).
Alternatively, a student may have a protected liberty interest, for example, in receiving a high
school diploma that is a prerequisite to the practice of a chosen profession, see, e.g., Note,
supra note 193, at 1020 & n.14 (citing, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373
U.S. 96, 102 (1963) (liberty interest in bar membership); Grove v. Ohio State Univ., College of
Veterinary Medicine, 424 F. Supp. 377, 382-83 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (possible liberty interest in
admission to graduate school because it plays crucial role in entry into given profession)), or in
not being defamatorily denominated a "functional illiterate" by the state, see, e.g., Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976) (concluding that an action for damage to reputation
requires proof of government-imposed stigma based on a label that is false, has been
publicized, and has either changed plaintiff's status under state law or resulted in a tangible
loss); Brookhart v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding that
denial of diploma for failure to pass minimum competency tests is stigmatizing and infringes
liberty interest); Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 8 (8th Cir. 1975) (concluding that dismissal
from school for lack of "intellectual ability" infringes liberty interest); Debra P., 474 F. Supp.
at 258 (finding a liberty interest in not being labeled a "functional illiterate" for failure to pass
state-mandated test). See also Note, supra note 125 (arguing that a protected liberty interest in
receiving a diploma arises as a quid pro quo for loss of liberty entailed by compulsory
attendance laws).
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the test is given to enable the students successfully to complete that
course of study.
The difficult question, of course, is whether any other educational
procedures, in fairness, are due. In New York and elsewhere, legisla-

tors themselves have helped answer this question, concluding that in
order to give students a meaningful opportunity to establish that they
fall within the class of persons whom the state intends to benefit with
a diploma, "[e]ach public school district shall offer students attending
its schools the opportunity to meet all the requirements for . . . a

Regents high school diploma. 2 0 3 For students failing tests the first
time, moreover, the necessary educational means include remedial
instruction "appropriate... to enable them to score above the State

reference point on the [next] corresponding" test.2 " Likewise, by
codifying the assumption that all children, upon the application of
reasonable effort, are capable of passing state-mandated tests2° 5-and
by presumptively or conclusively blaming the schools when substantial numbers of students in the school fail the tests206-- New York
arguably has concluded that due educational procedures include
instructional services sufficient so that most students in a school 207 in
fact do pass state-mandated examinations. 08

203 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 100.2(e) (1989).
204 Id. § 100.3(b); see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-4a (1986) (expressing "concern of the state...
that each child shall have.., equal opportunity to receive a suitable program of educational
experiences"). Although the courts are not bound by the procedures the states themselves
annex to the property interests they create, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532 (1985); infra note 213, the courts, in determining what procedures the due process clause
demands, are by no means barred from considering the kinds of procedures authoritative
sources have deemed necessary to protect state-given property interests. See supra note 133
(reliance on statutorily specified or implied procedures contributes to democratic legitimacy).
205 See supra notes 113, 122-23 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 102, 140; supra note 122 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 140 (suggesting as a presumptive benchmark an 80 or 85% passing rate).
208 Traditional legal analyses of "how much process is due" also support a right to adequate
instruction and remedial services sufficient to enable most students at a school, upon the
application of reasonable effort, to score at or above standard. First, "the private interests that
will be affected," Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), by students' failure to meet
minimum standards and, accordingly, to receive a diploma are great. See Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (noting that result of denying children a "basic education" is "a lifetime
[ofl hardship" and the "stigma of illiteracy," which marks its victims "for the rest of their
lives"). The irreplaceability of public educational services for poor children also supports the
requirement of stringent procedures before benefits may be withdrawn. Compare Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264, 266-71 (1970) (because welfare benefits are irreplaceable and their
loss leaves recipients destitute, full predenial hearing required) with Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341-
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Aside from access to the federal courts, do procedural due process
theories add anything to actions premised on mandamus or other
direct-enforcement theories? 0 9 I believe they do. Most importantly,
the protocol for identifying property rights and "due" procedures is
different from the protocol for identifying "mandamusable" statutory
duties in ways that modestly may improve the strength of plaintiffs'
case. Moreover, from the standpoint of neutral policy concerns, procedural due process claims do not diminish and may enhance the
soundness of litigated outcomes.
In the absence of clearly directive language, the property right on
which plaintiffs probably will rely in minimum-standards litigation is
not the right to a particular outcome on a legislatively mandated test
but rather the right to a diploma or some other benefit that the state
conditions on scores on that test. Procedural due process analysis,
that is, focuses attention not simply on the expectations that the
administration of state-mandated tests do or may create, but in addition on the less debatable expectations created by laws compelling
43 (because loss of Social Security disability benefits does not deprive recipient of recourse to
alternative sources of subsistence, no right to predenial hearing). Second, "the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of [this] interest"-the risk, that is, that students who want to learn the
skills tested on state-mandated examinations nonetheless will fail to do so because of
inadequate instruction-and the "probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards," id. at 334-35, is high, given the huge numbers of poor and minority children
currently falling below standards, see supra notes 94, 119 and accompanying text, and the
known availability of educational interventions capable of forestalling that result. See, e.g.,
authority cited supra notes 148-52. Finally, there is no "government[al] interest," Mathews,
424 U.S. at 334-35, that justifies denying students the educational means to pass tests the state
has identified as measuring the minimum skills necessary in modern life. For in stark contrast
to more typical procedural due process situations-in which officials have sound fiscal and
other reasons to deny expensive evidentiary hearings, for example, to prisoners whom the state
has an interest in disciplining, or to disability recipients whose benefits the state wishes to
terminate, or to debtors from whom the state has an interest in seizing property to satisfy
unliquidated debts-education officials have only an uncertain fiscal interest at best in denying
students educational services sufficient to enable them to become productive members of
society. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (denying children a basic education
"foreclose[s] any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the
progress of our Nation").
209 Although much has been written about the relative merits of state and federal
adjudication of questions fit for both forums, e.g., Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States:
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535
(1986); Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State
Constitution, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 297 (1977), lawyers no doubt will resolve that issue on the basis
of instance-specific considerations that are not subject to interesting treatment here. See, e.g.,
infra note 257 and accompanying text.
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children to attend school and the benefits, such as diplomas, that
schools traditionally have provided children in return for that loss of
liberty.21 0 By easing the burden of proving an enforceable duty and
right, procedural due process analysis may tend to increase the likelihood that plaintiffs will succeed. That analysis continues to function
satisfactorily from the standpoint of democratic policy, however,
because the analysis continues to focus attention on expectations that
the legislature legitimately and foreseeably created among members of
its constituency.
Procedural due process analysis tempers the extent to which it
favors plaintiffs by including a requirement that is not analogous to
any of the traditional elements of mandamus: Plaintiffs must establish
a denial of some type of "process" that the state in fairness was
obliged to provide before frustrating plaintiffs' legislatively created
expectations. Establishing a right to meaningful "educational process"-the crux of the due process analysis sketched above-is likely
to confront plaintiffs with a significant hurdle, moreover, because of
the concept's relative novelty. Plaintiffs may find the hurdle worth
interposing, however, because it so squarely presents to the courts the
central question of fairness that stigmatizing minimum-standards
laws raise: Whether a state fairly may harm children it compels to
attend school by imposing expectations-frustrating consequences on
those children when they fail state-mandated tests that they demonstrably are without the instructional means to pass.
Forcing an authoritative answer to that question also may have
advantageous policy consequences. Above, I discounted the danger
that the proposed strategy would enhance the harm of duty-creating
minimum-standards laws that irresponsibly scapegoat school officials
by blaming them for educational failures they are technologically
" ' Here, I make a stronger claim: The
incapable of avoiding.21
"what
process is due" analysis positively discourages the probably greater
danger that legislators will enact minimum-standards laws that irresponsibly scapegoat children by denying them expected benefits on
the basis of obstacles the state interposes but provides children with
no fair opportunity to surmount.212 Thus, rather than inviting courts
See authority cited supra note 202.
See supra notes 141-65 and accompanying text.
There are two reasons why the danger of minimum-standards laws that irresponsibly
scapegoat poor and minority children is greater than the danger of laws that irresponsibly
210
211
212
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undemocratically to create public duties that the public does not
mean to impose on its officials,2 1 3 procedural due process analysis

arguably facilitates responsible and democratically legitimate decisionmaking by discouraging the cynical or sloppy legislative creation
of politically popular expectations that the legislature does not intend

to fulfill or has not thought carefully about how to fulfill. 214 To give a
scapegoat school officials. First, poor and minority children may be less capable than school
officials of protecting their interests in the legislative process. Second, blaming poor and
minority children for unavoidable educational failures frustrates the choice-enhancing
purposes of public education in a liberal polity, see supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text,
while scapegoating public employees is a routine and potentially salutary aspect of democratic
government, see J. Shklar, supra note 136, at 7, 95-97.
213 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 413 U.S. 134, 153 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing
that, absent a "bitter with the sweet" doctrine, which would limit constitutionally "due"
procedures to those the state's expectations-creating legislation already supplies, procedural
due process law frustrates majoritarian policies). But see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985) (eight-person majority rejects "bitter with the sweet"
doctrine).
214 Thus, once the legislature adopts a policy-say, that all children can learn, should be
given the means to do so, and should be benefited if they do and penalized if they do not-and
once the legislature gives administrators the duty to implement that policy, the due process
clause arguably requires a "rational" bureaucratic system capable of implementing that policy
"in a reasonably coherent fashion." J. Mashaw, supra note 121, at 227, 230, 242-44. If the
legislature or administrators adopt an implementation process that is not "instrumental to the
[policy's] achievement" or is irrational, the courts legitimately may substitute a more
instrumental and rational policy. Id. In so doing, the courts are not dictating implementation
procedures so much as "remanding to the legislature" to choose a better process for achieving
its policy or to change the policy. Id. at 243-44. To explain the democratic legitimacy of a due
process regime that substitutes judicially for legislatively specified procedures, I would take the
"remand to the legislature" feature of due process adjudication further than Professor Mashaw
takes it. Cf. id. at 165, 178-79 (noting value of enhancing participation in the making as well
as the implementation of policy but finding no support in the due process case law for doing so
and doubting consistency of such an approach with the administrative state). Although I
cannot fully explain here how I would do so, the outlines of the theory are as follows: The
imposition of demanding procedures through due process adjudication can "impose costs on
government" that encourage legislators to consider "the transformation, even the
abandonmment of government activities." Id. at 5. Although often considered an
undemocratic embarrassment, see id. at 260-64, this effect of due process adjudication becomes
a democratic virtue if two prerequisites are met: (1) Judicially inspired legislative
reconsideration is limited to circumstances in which the legislature's initial consideration
probably left undemocratically out of account the interests of a small or insular group of
persons whose legitimate expectations are frustrated by the legislation and its original
implementation process, see Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 Calif. L.
Rev. 1044, 1104 (1984); and (2) "remanding" for legislative reconsideration would give the
adversely affected citizens "access to the ... forums in which rights are being created," J.
Mashaw, supra note 121, at 36. The first prerequisite arguably is supplied by the due process
doctrines that predicate judicial intervention on legislative burdens that are isolated or uneven
rather than uniform, compare Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (adjudicatory
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concrete example, a state legislature might be free to replace a relatively generous educational system-say, one in which the state compels children to attend school and to attend conscientiously to their

lessons and offers a diploma in return-with a less generous systemsay, one in which the state similarly compels children but offers no
benefit in return.215 But, when lawmakers decide to make such a
change, a concern for responsible legislative decisionmaking suggests
that they ought to do so directly and substantively, rather than by
interposing indirect procedural obstacles that covertly withhold from
children a benefit that the children justifiably think they have fulfilled
the requirements to receive.21 6 In sum, procedural due process analysis presents plaintiffs with opportunities as well as obstacles that, on
balance, may increase plaintiffs' likelihood of success while at the
same time generating positive policy consequences.
D. Actions to Enforce ConstitutionalDuties Defined by MinimumStandards Legislation

For years, litigants have been asking courts to define a minimum
level of education that the federal and state constitutions require
states to provide schoolchildren. The educational finance-equity and
educational malpractice initiatives of the 1970's and 1980's are examples of this quest, as are some aspects of the school desegregation
process necessary given isolated and uneven application of local tax) with Bi-Metallic
Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (no adjudicatory process
necessary given uniform application of tax), and on a significant discrepancy between the
relatively large impact of the legislation and its original implementation process on the
adversely affected citizens and the relatively modest benefits afforded the state by that
implementation process compared to other available processes, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 313, 334-35 (1976) (discussed supra note 208). The second prerequisite is satisfied if, as
seems likely, the procedures the court imposes prompt burdened administrators to seek
legislative relief, and if the previously successful lawsuit gives the plaintiffs or their advocates a
place at the bargaining or committee-hearing table when new legislation is considered. See J.
Mashaw, supra note 121, at 34, 245. The use of due process adjudication to reform the
legislative process also helps explain the Court's otherwise puzzling insistence on a legislative
or "positivist" property-right trigger for due process intervention. See supra notes 193-94 and
accompanying text.
215 But cf. Note, supra note 125 (arguing that removing diploma "quid pro quo" would
render compelled school attendance unconstitutional).
216 On the value of legislative candor, see J. Ely, supra note 56, at 124-31; Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1972); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 69-73 (1985).
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movement of the preceding thirty-five years. Until recently, these
efforts have had only modest success.2 1 7 Now, however, the prolifera-

tion of state educational standards arguably eases the burden plaintiffs
heretofore have faced in attempting to establish a federal or state constitutional right to a minimum level of educational services or performance. Most importantly, the new standards neutralize a series of
policy arguments that commentators and courts commonly have
asserted against judicial intervention in the adequate-education
sphere.2 1 8

For example, courts frequently concluded in the past that plaintiffs
could not convincingly point to an "identifiable quantum of education" definitive of adequacy other than the minimum level already

required under state law, which was so minimal that even plaintiffs
did not contend they were not receiving it.219 Recent minimum-standards legislation substantially alters this situation by setting the
"quantum of education" that defines minimum educational competence at levels substantially higher and more objective than the
"teacher, book, and a bus" formula the courts gleaned from state law
and found satisfied in the seventies and early eighties.220 Today, the
See Briffault, supra note 172, at 35-38; Elson, supra note 151, at 889-901; Note, supra
note 82, at 1670-78.
218 See, e.g., authority cited supra note 128.
219 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24, 36-37 (1973) (noting
absence of judicially "identifiable" constitutional minimum level of education, accepting
Texas's "assert[ion] that [its statutory] Minimum Foundation Program [for funding schools]
provides an 'adequate' education for all children in the State," and concluding both that "[n]o
proof was offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the State's assertion" and that in
the present case "no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child
with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimum skills"); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986) ("[P]etitioners do not allege that school children in the Chickasaw
Counties are not taught to read or write."); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60
Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976) (state law identified no general duty to educate
plaintiff); Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48, 439 N.E.2d 359,
369, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 653 (1982) ("If what is made available by this system [of state
education laws] . . . may properly be said to constitute an education, the constitutional
mandate [to provide an education] is satisfied").
220 See, e.g.; San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodreguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (relying
upon a Texas statute establishing a so-called "Minimum Foundation Program of Education"
to conclude that the state supplied an adequate program of education "[b]y providing 12 years
of free public-school education, and by assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating
funds"); Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48, 439 N.E.2d 359,
368-69, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 653 (1982) (finding state constitutional requirement of a "system of
free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated," N.Y. Const. art.
XI, § 1, satisfied because legislature made and state satisfied "prescriptions... with reference
217
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state's own statistics are likely to document stark and consistent patterns of performance below the state's own measure of minimal
adequacy. 21
Minimum-standards laws also answer the anti-interventionist arguments that a minimally adequate education cannot be identified
because no one yet knows how to educate poor and minority children
adequately and that, in any event, legislators, not judges, should make

the hard decisions on such controversial matters.22 First, by applying upgraded standards to children universally compelled to attend
school, state lawmakers have implicitly, and in some cases explicitly,
rejected the anti-interventionists' implied assumption that many (for
example, poor and minority) children cannot learn. 23 Second, given
the comprehensive curricular and other input requirements, testing
and other diagnostic procedures, remedial-services regimens, and
"school improvement" programs that the minimum-standards laws
themselves embody and that state and local education departments
across the country have developed in response to them,224 the new
laws significantly reduce the remedial burdens courts can anticipate if
they entertain "minimally adequate education" litigation. Instead of
having to develop their own remedial regimes, the courts need simply
order school, district, and state officials to supply the educational
inputs required by state law and whatever other services those officials
deem necessary to enable children, with reasonable effort, to satisfy
the performance standards that the state legislature has concluded all
children can satisfy. 2 5 In sum, by enacting specific and universally
to the minimum number of days of school attendance, required courses, textbooks,
qualifications of teachers ....pupil transportation, and other matters").
221 New York's statistics, for example, reveal schools filled with children falling below
standard and districts filled with schools the state has labeled failures. See supra note 119.
222 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973) (expressing
skepticism that additional educational inputs would enhance educational outcomes for poor
children because the answer to this question "is not likely to be divined for all time even by the
scholars who now so earnestly debate the issues.... [T]he judiciary is well advised to refrain
from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints... [on the] experimentation so
vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems").
223 See supra note 222.

224 See, e.g., P. Hill, supra note 148.
225 Cases tying remedial orders to state educational standards in the desegregation context
are Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1297 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (approving settlement of
desegregation case that mandated new programs and facilities sufficient to satisfy state
standards), cert. denied sub nom. Leggett v. Liddell, 469 U.S. 816 (1984); Jenkins v. Missouri,
639 F. Supp. 19, 24, 26 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (ordering state to expand financial aid to previously
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applicable minimum standards, state legislators have made the hard
policy decisions, leaving the courts with an enforcement role that conforms to traditional visions of the judicial function. 2 6

Finally, the rash of state-mandated educational-performance
requirements that students, teachers, and districts must meet-not to
mention the numerous state "takeover" provisions that recently have

come into vogue 2 7-neutralize, as well, the third policy basis upon
which courts over the last twenty years have refused to intervene in
education matters-the asserted importance of purely local decisionmaking in such matters.228
The above analysis suggests that, by relying on minimum-standards
legislation to illustrate the honorable role of educational distributivism in even miserly early-1990's versions of liberalism and the hollow-

ness of the old anti-interventionist boilerplate, plaintiffs might
increase their likelihood of success in renewed finance-equity and even
educational malpractice and school-desegregation litigation. 229 As
the following discussion demonstrates, the analysis also suggests the
possibility of altogether new strategies for giving "minimally adequate
education" content to equal protection and public-education provisions of the federal and state constitutions.
L

Equal Protection Theories

Parents may establish a violation of the federal equal protection
clause by showing that school officials treat their children differently
segregated district in amount sufficient to enable it to achieve state's highest school-district
rating because highest rating signifies that the "school system quantitatively and qualitatively
has the resources necessary to provide minimum basic education to its students"; also ordering
school officials to take steps necessary to raise black students' scores on state-mandated tests to
national norm), afi'd on this ground, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 708 (1987); Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569, 598 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (ordering
educational-enhancement programs sufficient to raise the test scores of black children to
specified level in order to overcome effects of dejure segregation), afrd, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied sub nom. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Reed, 445 U.S. 935 (1980).
226 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 113 and 174.
228 See, e.g., authority cited supra note 113.
229 See Briffault, supra note 172, at 36-37 (recent increase in amount and success of financeequity litigation); Goldberg, School in Kentucky Faces "Malpractice" Charge, Educ. Week,
Nov. 16, 1988, at 6; supra notes 54-78, 89 and accompanying text (discussing "traditional"
school desegregation and finance-equity litigation); supra note 89 (recent surge in litigative and
legislative activity seeking statewide equalization of per capita spending on public education).
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from other similarly situated children with respect to some educational benefit2 3 and that the disparate treatment is arbitrary2 3 1 or

impinges on some "important" or "fundamental" personal interest
without serving some correspondingly significant or "compelling"
state interest. 232 Minimum-standards legislation improves parents'
chances of establishing the "disparate treatment," "arbitrariness,"
and "important/fundamental" interest elements of equal protection
liability.
a. Disparate Treatment
The new standards provide an uncontroversial means of meeting
the threshold "disparate treatment" requirement: If schools full of
230 Disparate treatment occurs when persons similarly situated are treated differently or
when persons differently situated are treated the same. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
1438-39 (2d ed. 1988); see, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (suggesting that
state statute, by requiring all persons to pay filing fee to commence divorce action improperly
failed to treat rich and poor differently).
231 E.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (arbitrariness scrutiny of
legislation treating patrons of some school districts differently from others with respect to
availability of free transportation to school); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (arbitrariness scrutiny of legislation providing different levels of educational
funding above a state-mandated minimum for various districts in state).
232 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, 223-24 (1982) (invalidating legislation
allowing school districts to refuse to educate children of illegal aliens because legislation
adversely affected children's ability to receive an education-which "has a fundamental role"
in our society-without serving a "substantial" state interest). Intentional discrimination
against persons on the basis of their race or ethnicity also violates the equal protection clause
absent a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Illustrating the difficulty of
proving intentional discrimination absent explicit statutory categorization by race are, e.g.,
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Although
awareness on the part of lawmakers or administrators that action they take will
disproportionately harm members of a suspect class is not the same as purposeful
discrimination, see Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279, that awareness permits "a strong inference that the
adverse effects were desired." Id. at 279 n.25. On the possibility that legislators' adoption of
minimum-standards legislation despite its well known racially disparate impact on access to
diplomas, see authority cited supra note 100, might make out a violation of the suspectclassification branch of equal protection analysis, compare Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926,
979 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (finding intent to discriminate based on highly visible racially segregative
effect of district's procedure for assigning children to "educable mentally retarded" tracks),
afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984), with Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp.
472, 499-500 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (finding "no evidence whatsoever that [a competency-testing]
policy was a subterfuge to increase the value of the diploma while denying access ... to black
children").
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children on one side of a district or state are satisfying state-defined
outcome measures and being awarded diplomas, while substantial
portions of similarly situated children attending schools elsewhere in
the district or state are not, state-sponsored disparate treatment
exists.233 Moreover, the legislation's implicit or explicit conclusion
that all children in regular programs in the state are capable of satisfying the state's minimum-performance requirements should help
impoverished and minority parents establish that their children are
for these purposes situated similarly to other children in the state and,
hence, deserve the same outcomes.
b. Arbitrariness
Because officials may avoid a finding of arbitrariness by establishing
merely that their disparate treatment of similarly situated citizens
benefits the state in a legitimate way-including saving the state a
little money 234 -- the courts rarely hold that government-sponsored
disparate treatment is actionably arbitrary.235 Nevertheless, minimum-standards enactments arguably afford a basis for such a holding
by depriving state officials of any legitimate reason for affording a
minimum level of education to some children but not to others. For
once a state commits itself to the proposition that a minimally adequate education includes instruction sufficient to enable all children in
the state to pass certain tests, and once it commits itself to providing
all children with the means to do so, 236 the state arguably has disclaimed the legitimacy of any, even fiscal, interest in withholding
233 E.g., Debra P., 644 F.2d at 401; Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472, 486-88 (S.D. Ga.
1981). Contrariwise, if some students receive the same amount of educational inputs and are
judged according to the same diploma-determining standards as others but for some
demonstrable reason (e.g., limited English proficiency) need more resources than the others to
achieve the legally specified minimum standards, it might be argued that "unlikes" are being
unlawfully treated "alike." See supra note 230.
234 E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973).
235 But cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (invalidating Alabama
statute that taxed out-of-state insurance companies at higher rate than in-state ones); United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (holding that regulation limiting
distribution of federal food stamps to households containing no unrelated persons bears no
rational relationship to statute's legitimate purposes of satisfying nutritional needs and helping
nation's agriculture); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (finding no rational basis for
involuntarily committing nondangerous persons to mental institutions).
236 See supra notes 113, 122-23 and accompanying text.
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those means from some subset of its young citizens.23 7 Although the

state continues to retain a legitimate interest in providing some children with less expensive means to pass the tests than it provides other
children, it has no legitimate interest in providing some children with
no means to pass the tests, as arguably occurs, for example, when a
majority of children in a particular school or district persistently falls
below standard.238
This arbitrariness analysis is a constitutionalized, but otherwise
only rhetorically distinct, version of the mandamus theory discussed
above:239 If the state has promised to provide all children with access
to certain educational outcomes, it may not legitimately withhold
those outcomes from some children but not others on the basis of
competing state interests that it presumedly considered but rejected

when it legislated the promise. Accordingly, the likelihood-of-success
and policy caveats discussed in the mandamus section above apply as
well to this legal theory.

237 Thus, whether or not equal protection analysis should invalidate legislation that cannot
be shown to serve purposes the state expressly has articulated, compare Gunther, supra note
216, at 21, 44-45, 46-47 (advocating requirement that legislative purposes be articulated) with
J. Ely, supra note 56, at 124-31 (doubting practicality of legislative-articulation requirement),
equal protection analysis surely should invalidate legislation justified exclusively on the basis
that it serves purposes that the state expressly has foresworn.
238 Decisions concluding that tuition charges for public school students are unconstitutional
use something like this analysis. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 15 n.60 (1973) (dicta) (judicial intervention possibly appropriate to remedy state's use
of tuition to exclude poor students); McMillan v. Board of Educ., 430 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970)
(reversing dismissal of plaintiff's claim that school board had violated equal protection clause
by placing ceiling on private school tuition grants for handicapped children at level lower than
cost the school board would incur to maintain the child in a public school classroom); Kruse v.
Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va.) (insufficient tuition grants to handicapped students
unconstitutional), vacated on other grounds, 434 U.S. 808 (1977); Halderman v. Pittinger, 391
F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (finding that insufficient tuition grants may violate equal
protection clause even though insufficient funding to operate entire school system may not).
Thus, the escape available to the Supreme Court in Rodriguez and similarly unsuccessful
finance-equity cases-namely, that the state legitimately and nonarbitrarily could treat some
children worse than others as' long as it provided all children with the "teacher, book, and a
bus" level of education that state law then defined as minimally adequate, see supra note 220
and accompanying text-is not available once the state redefines minimal adequacy in terms of
quantitative performance standards that substantial numbers of its children in identifiable
schools and districts persistently fail to attain.
239 See supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
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c. Important or FundamentalInterest
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez"4 long has
been understood to reject the notion that education is a "fundamental" interest that states must distribute to citizens equally, absent a
compelling state justification for doing otherwise. The decision actually concedes, however, both that state action "occasion[ing] an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children" might
violate the equal protection clause241 and that there may be "some
identifiable quantum of education [that] is ... constitutionally protected." 242 In its 1982 decision in Plyler v. Doe,243 the Court implemented the former concession, holding unconstitutional a Texas
statute that did indeed absolutely deny children not "legally admitted" into the country the right to attend public schools. Noting that
Texas's denial of an education to illegal-alien children marked them
with the "stigma of illiteracy ...for the rest of their lives," denied
"them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions,"
and "foreclose[d] any realistic possibility that they will contribute in
even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation," the Court ruled
the educational interest at stake sufficiently important-if not actually
"fundamental"-that Texas could not absolutely withhold it from
illegal aliens absent a "substantial," more-than-merely-fiscal, interest
served by the discrimination. 2 " Then, in Papasanv. Allain245 in 1986,
the Court reinvigorated the second Rodriguez concession, identifying
as unsettled the question "whether a minimally adequate education is
a fundamental right" of the sort that a state may not "discriminatorily infringe" without engendering "heightened equal protection
240 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (discussed supra notes 219-20 and 222).
241 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
242 Id. at 36.
243 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
244 Id. at 223-24, 227; see id. at 221 (stating that education is not "merely some
governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare"). Plyler also, it
should be noted, relied on the discreteness of the class of illegal-alien children against whom
the state discriminated. Id. at 223. Absolute governmental deprivations of important benefits
are particularly likely to engage the courts' exacting attention when the state-as in the sphere
of education-exercises more or less of a monopoly over the benefit in question. See, e.g.,
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (concluding that because state has monopoly on
means for dissolving marriages and because marriage has an important place in our society's
scheme of values, denying indigents access to a divorce because of their inability to afford the
$60 filing fee violates Constitution).
245 478 U.S. 263 (1986).
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As noted, scores of states now explicitly rely on minimum-performance standards to measure "functional literacy" and the capacity to
participate productively in modem society. 247 Taken together with
the dictum in Papasan regarding the "right to a minimally adequate
education" and the two interests identified as constitutionally "important" in Plyler-literacy and the ability to live within and contribute
to our civic institutions-the states' minimum-standards enactments
seem well calculated to "identif[y the] quantum of education [that] is
... constitutionally protected. '24 8 If the standards do demarcate an
"important" or "fundamental" educational interest, moreover, a
state's distribution of the wherewithal to meet the standards to the
children assigned to some schools but not to the children assigned
elsewhere, then the fiscal interest served by the disparity, which
arguably is barely rational at best, would not rise to the constitutionally necessary level of a "substantial" or "compelling" interest, and an
equal protection violation would be established.
The difficulty with fundamental-interest equal protection analysis
always has been how to identify a basis other than the judge's own
druthers for designating particular interests as fundamental.2 4 9 One
might try to locate such a basis in liberal theory, which arguably
forms a "penumbra" around the federal Constitution as a whole 250
and which, as I argue above, strongly suggests that education is more
fundamental than other governmental services.2 51 One also might try
to locate such a basis in the acknowledgments of a right to an educaId. at 285.
247 See Debra P., 644 F.2d at 400 n.1 (Florida minimum competency tests designed to
measure functional literacy and capacity for productive participation in modem life); Regents
246

Action Plan, supra note 95, at 1 (New York's minimum standards reflect "what our children
must know and be able to do in their 21st Century lifetime" and assess their development of a

"stake in the meaning of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness").
248Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
249 See, e.g., J. Ely, supra note 56, at 43-72.

250 E.g., B. Ackerman, supra note 87, at 273-324; J. Mashaw, supra note 121, at 172-221; D.
Richards, Moral Criticism of Law 44-56 (1977); Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A
Casenote on Flagg Broi v. Brooks, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1296 (1982); Dworkin, Neutrality,
Equality, and Liberalism, in Liberalism Reconsidered 1 (D. MacLean & C. Mills eds. 1983);

see also The Federalist No. 52, at 324 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (republican form of
government instrumental to preserving liberty); J.Ely, supra note 56, at 100-01 (offering
democratically based theory of Constitution but acknowledging that democracy is
instrumental to liberal ends).
251 See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
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tion found in the fundamental positive law of nearly all fifty states. 252
After being presented in Rodriguez with analogous indicia of education's fundamentality, however, the Supreme Court demurred, refusing to locate a "fundamentality" conclusion in sources less tangible
than even the "penumbras" of specific clauses of the Constitution. 5 3
The relative strength of two competing trends in modern constitutional law will have an important impact on whether litigants can
convince the Court to change its mind about the fundamentality of
education based on the Court's post-Rodriguez precedents and on the
legislative consensus that recently has formed around elevated and
objectively measurable educational outcomes: the decreasing willingness of the Court to identify fundamental values in the process of constitutional interpretation,2 54 and the Court's increasing reliance upon
majoritarian decisionmaking as the single source of constitutionally
important values.2 55 Because most of the other legal theories dis252 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
253 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29-39. Education thus has presented the Court with a more
difficult question than such penumbrally located interests as voting, avoiding unfair criminal
conviction, and even interstate travel. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(changing residence from one state to another a constitutional right); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax violates equal protection clause because of disparate
impact on fundamental interest in voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(deciding merits of indigent defendants' one appeal of right without benefit of counsel violates
equal protection clause).
254 See authority cited supra note 109.
255 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 108, at 56-74. Illustrating both trends is the Court's
and particularly Justice White's progression in interpreting the eighth amendment's "cruel and
unusual punishment clause" from Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-600 & nn.5-12 (1977)
(plurality opinion of White, J.) (acknowledging Court's responsibility to exercise its "own
judgment . . . on the acceptability of the death penalty [for rape] under the Eighth
Amendment" and relying on a number of national and international statutory and academic
sources, including but not limited to the recent views of state legislatures in the United States
to inform that judgment) and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-801 & nn.18-24 (1982)
(majority opinion of White, J.) (concluding that, "[a]lthough the judgments of legislatures,
juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge'whether the
Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on one.., who does not himself
kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place," and relying upon various sources to
inform that judgment) to Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2979 (1989) (plurality opinion
of Scalia, J., joined, inter alia, by White, J.) ("emphatically reject[ing]" view that Court may
exercise its "own informed judgment" in regard to whether the eighth amendment permits
imposition of the death penalty on 16- and 17-year olds and arguing that the Court's analysis
should be limited to determining whether "[a] revised national consensus" against executing
juveniles "appear[s] in the operative acts (laws and the application of laws) that the people
have approved"). I realize that the two trends delineated in text are contradictory in one
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cussed here have a reasonable chance of taking advantage of the latter, majoritarian trend without implicating the former, "interpretive"
trend, those theories are likely to fare better than the fundamentalrights theory, which cannot avoid implicating the "interpretive"
trend. 6
Nonetheless, if plaintiffs decide to bring lawsuits based upon the
other theories discussed here, they might reasonably decide to include
a fundamental-interest equal protection claim as well, based on one of
the following three possibilities: (1) The Court, prompted by lower
court adjudication exploring the openings left by Rodriguez, Plyler,
and Papasan, or by changes in its own personnel (in which our selfproclaimed Education President may play an important role), might
be convinced to revise its ruling in Rodriguez; (2) a state supreme
court, presented with a suit brought under the state's equal protection
clause, might be more persuaded than the United States Supreme
Court by the indicia of fundamentality present in the state's positive
law; or (3) the state's high court, as already has occurred in a few
states, might free the state's equal protection provision of the doctrinal tether that Rodriguez imposes. 257 The latter two possibilities suggest a preference for litigation of fundamental-rights claims in the
state courts and particularly in those courts that have uncoupled state
and federal equal protection analysis or have recognized a state constitutional basis for identifying education as fundamentally important.
2. State ConstitutionalPublic Education Theories
The public education provisions found in most state constitutions
provide the final legal strategy sketched here for enforcing the new
legislative standards on behalf of poor and minority children.2"' Typsense: The second trend identifies democratic decisionmaking as just the sort of fundamental
value that the first trend says the Court ought not to have any role in identifying.
256 See J. Ely, supra note 56, at 1 (introducing the term "interpretivism" and defining it as
the view that judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing
norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution). A civil rights lawyer
might decide that a federal fundamental-rights theory is more likely to succeed than the other
theories discussed here if she first concluded that the directive impact of the minimumstandards laws enacted nationwide, taken as a whole, is considerably greater than the directive
impact of the minimum-standards laws of the state in which her clients attend school.
257 E.g., decisions cited in Briffault, supra note 172, at 35 n.128.
258 See Ratner, supra note 82, at 814-15 (48 of 50 state constitutions contain public
education provisions).
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ical of these provisions are ones that require the state to provide a
system of "free public schools" or a "thorough and efficient" educational system.159 Already, the high courts of a number of states have
interpreted their constitutional public education clauses in the context
of finance-equity litigation to impose a legally enforceable duty upon
state education officials to provide an adequate education to children
in their states-and most of those courts relied heavily upon state

statutory requirements as the measure of the constitutionally required
education. 60 Conversely, a number of courts in the past denied children relief under constitutional public education provisions by interpreting those provisions in pari materia with the states' then rather
toothless statutory education requirements, which the plaintiffs did
not or could not allege were being violated.26 '
The courts' frequent equation of state constitutional and statutory
definitions of "a public" or "a thorough and efficient education"
implies that if a legislature adopts minimum-standards laws that
implicitly or explicitly add muscle to the statutory concept of an adequate education, then state courts may well interpret or reinterpret

then enforce the state's constitutional public education provisions
consistently with the recently strengthened statutory provisions. The
likelihood that courts will do so increases as proof amasses that the
259 See id.; supra note 82 and accompanying text.
260 See Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 647-48, 376 A.2d 359, 373-74 (1977) (concluding
that education is a fundamental right, the contours of which are defined by the state's equaleducational-opportunity and compulsory-attendance statutes); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J.
475, 513, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (1973) (holding that state constitution's "thorough and efficient
education" clause requires state legislature to define and ensure provision of ample and equal
opportunity for all children); Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 456, 355 A.2d 129, 132-34
(1976) (in subsequent litigation, upholding on its face statute assuring all children in state
"'educational opportunity which will prepare them to function politically, economically and
socially in a democratic society'" and providing for system of prescribed tests to monitor and
evaluate compliance with the requirement (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:7A-4 (West 1989));
Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (existing state
statute used as measure of constitutionally required level of education); Pauley v. Kelly, 162
W. Va. 672, 705-508, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877-78 (1979) (holding that state's "thorough and
efficient" clause requires schooling that "develops, as best the state of education expertise
allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful and
happy occupations, recreation and citizenship" and that contours of adequate-education
mandate are left principally to state legislature); see also Seattle School Dist. No. I v.
Washington, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P.2d 71, 94-95 (1978) (holding that state constitution
assures children a level of education sufficient to enable them to "compete adequately in our
open political system, in the labor market, or in the marketplace of ideas").
261 See supra note 220.
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education available in identifiable schools and districts in the state
fails to conform to the statutory provisions. As illustrated by a lawsuit recently filed in Connecticut, which relies in part on the minimum-standards rationale proposed here,2 62 this enforcement
technique is useful outside the context of--or even in the aftermath of
successfuF 6a -finance-equity litigation. This strategy, that is, enables
litigants to seek court orders requiring school officials to take
whatever steps are necessary and appropriate-whether fiscal or, if
fiscal efforts have not sufficed, otherwise-to enable failing schools
and districts to supply the statutorily defined and quantitatively measurable level of education that the state constitution requires.
Above, I argued that minimum-standards-based procedural due
process theories present the claims of individual children to a specified
level of education in a relatively attractive light from the perspectives
both of the plaintiff children and of democratic policy. 2 64 Analogously, the public education theory discussed here presents the claims
of the public at large to a specified level of educational services in an
especially attractive light from the same two perspectives.
State constitutions oblige legislators to provide few public benefits. 265 The inclusion in a state constitution of a clause requiring the
state to provide a "free" or "thorough and efficient" public education2 66 accordingly creates expectations with regard to public educational benefits that are not likely to arise in regard to other benefits
that legislatures might choose to provide. Moreover, once the courts
of a state cede to the state legislature the principal authority to construe, as well as to carry out, a constitutional "public education" provision,2 67 the expectations that the constitutional provision creates are
likely to coalesce around the laws the legislature enacts regarding
public education and to invest with special importance any educational outcomes those laws identify as desirable. If, therefore, legisla262 Scheff v. O'Neill (Hartford/New Britain Super. Ct. filed Apr. 26, 1989). Similar

lawsuits are being prepared for filing in the near future in Louisiana, New York, and North
Carolina. Interview with Helen Herschkoff, Associate Legal Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union (Feb. 27, 1990).
263 See Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Connecticut's legally
successful finance-equity litigation, discussed supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text).
264
265
266
267

See
See
See
See

supra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
supra notes 82, 258 and accompanying text.
authority cited supra notes 260-61.
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tots ever will and ever ought to be held to have constitutionally
created duties to the public that the public may enforce through
means other than elections, it will and ought to be when the following
two circumstances, which characterize the enforcement strategy proposed here, are present: first, when the state's fundamental law commits future generations of legislators to prescribing, then providing,
benefits of a particular type; and second, when, thereafter, a particular
legislature, in the due democratic course of its business, throws its
prescriptive weight behind a particular, objectively measurable
description of that benefit.
The courts in this situation still have to confront a number of difficult questions, including: (1) whether any judicial enforcement role
exists at all or whether, on the other hand, a political-question or
standing bar applies; (2) whether, if a judicial role exists, the legislature can be said to have thrown its "prescriptive" weight behind a
particular vision of the benefit it is constitutionally required to provide;268 and (3) whether in this, unlike the procedural due process,
context, 269 the bitter (for example, insufficient state funds and weak
enforcement mechanisms) accompanies the sweet (for example, a
commitment to the public to achieve certain educational outcomes).
In answering these questions, however, state courts may and arguably
ought to be disposed to treat the conjunction of the expectations arising out of the constitutional provision itself and the expectations arising out of the laws that the branch of government primarily
responsible for interpreting that provision has enacted as shifting the
burden of proof. Once plaintiffs in this situation have identified a lessthan-explicitly-directive but clearly outcome-specifying law, that is,
the burden justifiably might be shifted from the party claiming that a
duty to provide the specified outcome exists to the party claiming that
no such duty exists.
Put another way, there are two kinds of incentives that might facilitate the political process envisioned by a state constitution that
devolves substantial responsibility upon the legislature to define, as
well as to provide, a particular type of benefit: incentives that
encourage the legislature, when it legislates in regard to that benefit,
268 A legislature, that is, surely ought to be able to say, for example, that "full 'cultural
literacy' is desirable, but that for now something less will have to do."
269 See supra note 213.
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to say forthrightly how it defines the benefit; and incentives that discourage legislators from appearing to give benefits of that type with
one hand that the legislators cynically or carelessly withdraw with the
other hand. That preferred incentive structure is achieved, morever,
by imposing on the legislature the burden-either in the course of
minimum-standards litigation or, failing there, in responsive legislation-to establish that outcome-specifying educational enactments
that could lead the public to expect state education officials to achieve
those outcomes in fact were not designed or intended to do so.
Public education theories thus have two consequences. First, they
force courts directly to confront the question of how much education
the state is obliged to supply under a constitution promising citizens a
"free" or "thorough and efficient public education." Second, they
invite courts to use as a benchmark for resolving that question the
objectively measurable amount of education that the democratic
branch of government with principal responsibility for interpreting
the constitution has identified as desirable. As such, the public education claim seems to provide plaintiff schoolchildren with as legally
favorable and as politically legitimate an opportunity as is available to
secure judicial censure of failing school policies.
There are several available legal theories based on which courts reasonably might hold that minimum-standards laws create judicially
enforceable rights to objectively specified levels of educational services. Other things equal, two of those theories-federal procedural
due process and state public education theories-appear to offer the
greatest likelihood of litigative success without triggering adverse policy consequences or being susceptible to politically delegitimating
attacks. In the case of both preferred theories, analysis of whether the
statutory language creates enforceable duties focuses not only on the
legislators' intentions but also on the expectations that school children
and other concerned members of the public legitimately have formed
with regard to the level of education the state is obliged to provide.
Moreover, both theories premise the legitimacy of those expectations
on an important factor in addition to the terms of the minimum-standards laws themselves-the state's compulsory attendance and
diploma laws in the case of due process theory and the state's constitutional "free public education" provision in the case of public education theory.
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Earlier, I concluded that the legal doctrine and plaintiffs' incentives
are such that the proposed strategy's policy hazards are likely to be
minimized and its policy prospects are likely to be maximized in situations in which plaintiffs have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding
on the legal merits.2 7 ° My conclusions with regard to the strategy's
likelihood of legal success are more guarded: First, a litigation strategy of the sort proposed here potentially could succeed under existing
doctrine. Second, other things equal, the strategy is somewhat more
likely to succeed when plaintiffs rely on federal procedural due process doctrine and state public education clauses than when they rely
on the other theories delineated above. Third, the strategy is sufficiently viable to warrant experimentation with it when such instancespecific considerations as the following are favorable: the range and
educational importance of the duties arguably created by the minimum-standards laws;2 71 the strength of the indicia in the laws them2 72
selves and in their legislative history that they create public duties;
the strength of the expectations-creating features of the state's constitutional public education provision and in its compulsory-attendance
and diploma laws; the support that can be derived from the relevant
jurisdiction's legal precedents;2 73 the potency of the evidence that the
plaintiffs' schools are pervasively failing in their educational mission;274 the presence or absence of procedural obstacles relating to
timing, standing, class certification, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the like; and the political, demographic, and technological
availability of meaningful remedies.2 7 5
E.

Identifying Beneficially Enforceable Standards

By enacting stricter and more comprehensive minimum educational standards, the states have absolved the courts of some of the
difficult tasks that in the past have discouraged them from entering
the adequate-education field and have afforded plaintiffs a doctrinally
easier, if not yet easy, row to hoe. The enactments effect these
changes by: (1) defining a "minimally adequate education"; (2) conSee supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 276-93 and accompanying text.
272 See, e.g., supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
270
271

273

See, e.g., id.

274

See, e.g., supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141-65 and accompanying text.
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cluding that educational inputs can and do affect academic outcomes;
(3) more clearly defining just what the necessary inputs are, hence
providing more readily discernible and less intrusive judicial remedies; (4) divesting the tens of thousands of local school districts across
the nation of exclusive control over education and investing greater
control in the more judicially manageable hands of state education
departments; (5) establishing a more objective measure of actionable
disparities in the delivery of educational benefits; (6) depriving the
states of any claim to a legitimate fiscal motive for maintaining most
such disparities; (7) enhancing the constitutional importance of a rich
set of educational services and outcomes; and (8) giving content to
state constitutional clauses requiring the provision to students of a
public education.
With all this doctrinal good comes a potential remedial evil: To the
same degree that a statutory minimum standard's specificity increases
the likelihood that the courts will interpret that standard as imposing
an enforceable duty on school officials, that specificity also decreases
the flexibility of the remedy, commensurate with the statute, that the
courts can be expected to order. I consequently must confront the
question whether minimum-standards statutes are worth enforcingthat is, whether the standards will contribute meaningfully to an
enforceable and desirable educational entitlement.276
The chart on page 430 (chart) is designed to help me confront this
question. On the vertical axis I have listed nine descriptive characteristics that any given minimum-standards provision might possess.
Listed horizontally are three evaluative criteria that assess whether a
given minimum-standards statute lends itself to beneficial enforcement. At the intersection of these lines of inquiry I have offered my
(minimally adequately) educated guesses as to whether each characteristic makes a particular statute more or less worthy of enforcement.
Not surprisingly, the chart reveals a preference for enforcing minimum standards on which educational experts have reached consensus
(line 9). Given the fact that minimum reading and arithmetic skills
for children in elementary schools probably satisfy this criterion yet
are not currently supplied in many of our urban schools, 277 this
276 See authority cited supra notes 98-100 (suggesting that minimum standards are not
educationally desirable).
277 See supra notes 94 and 119.
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M
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apparently mundane conclusion has considerable practical bite. Likewise, the chart indicates that enforcement-minded advocates would

do well-still drawing upon expert assistance-to look for standards
with the following characteristics: (1) specified duty holders who, as a
group, have the instructional and political clout needed to make
meaningful changes in the educational environments of schools and
districts (line 3);278 (2) a broad enough range of beneficiaries so that
enforcement efforts will not rob many Peters to pay a few Paulas (line
4);279 (3) flexible remedies (line 5);280 and (4) inputs correlated with
desirable outcomes (line 6).281
Less encouraging is the pronounced tension the chart reveals (lines
1-7) between enforceability (which places a premium on specificity
and mandatoriness) and worthiness (which requires a substantial
degree of flexibility, lest teachers and students become test-giving and
-taking automatons2 2 ). This tension goes to the heart of the proposed
278 Likely candidates are statutes that impose duties on district- and state- as well as schoollevel personnel. See supra notes 95, 102, 113, 122 and 170.
279 For instance, statutes assuring places in "gifted and talented" programs to children with
IQ scores over 130 or requiring foreign language instruction might be less attractive
enforcement targets than ones assuring that all third graders have basic reading and arithmetic
skills.
280 See P. Hill, supra note 148 (case studies showing that mandated "school-improvement"
remedies in some cities and states include desirable amounts of flexibility); supra notes 102,
140, 170, and infra note 292 (state-mandated "school-improvement" programs).
28! The controversies over whether money and such interventions as desegregation and
"effective schools" methodology positively affect desirable outcomes are well known. The
authority cited supra notes 38-40, 148-51 exemplify the useful fund of expert knowledge that is
available on these questions. Apart from the inflexibility problem discussed below, outcome
standards (assuming that the standard used measures something like the outcome desired)
might seem more worthy of enforcement than input standards both because the ultimate goal
is improved outcomes and because input standards inevitably raise the difficult question of
whether particular inputs affect outcomes. On the other hand, output standards tend to be less
enforceable because they are less likely than input standards to reveal clearly the existence,
scope, holders, and beneficiaries of educative duties and appropriate remedies for breaches of
those duties, and because outcome standards present difficult causation questions with regard
to why children fail to meet standards. But cf. supra notes 117-25, 176-91, 219-21 and
accompanying text and infra note 289 (minimum standards enactments increase likelihood
that courts will infer and enforce duties); supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (arguing
that the enforcement of minimum standards laws and the use of litigation strategies that focus
on the performance of groups of children or of schools, as opposed to the performance of
individual children, ameliorate causation problems). The proper resolution of this tension
inevitably turns on a contextualized analysis of the worthiness of the particular input and the
enforceability of the particular outcome standards under consideration.
282 See supra note 99.
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strategy's viability: If minimum-standard statutes add anything to the
existence and enforceability of a meaningful "right to an adequate
education," it is precisely because of their mandatory and specific
nature, which for the first time gives potential agents of reform something tangible to enforce that need not be invented out of whole cloth.
If those same characteristics inevitably destroy the educational desirability of the strategy, however, the strategy should not be pursued.
Although I cannot finally solve this critical problem-nor, probably, does a uniform solution exist, given the heterogeneity of situations enforcement-minded advocates are likely to confront-several
potentially tension-relieving thoughts are in order. First, there are
certain outcomes-the ability of elementary children to read, write,
and cipher, for instance-as to which a fair amount of inflexible insistence probably is warranted. Second, other outcome measures-those
assessing the level at which junior-high and high school students read,
for example-might serve as a rough proxy for the general quality of
education available 'to those students; hence, enforcement might have
a broader beneficial impact than is suggested by the single attribute
being measured.
Third, although the result of enforcing a given standard may not be
perfect, appropriate circumstances might justify choosing the adequate enforcement of incomplete or second-best standards over nonenforcement of a better set of desiderata. Indeed, given the strong and
swelling public consensus formed around minimum standards and the
dismal educational circumstances in which poor and minority children now find themselves, the hypothesized choice seems to reflect
the
28 3
options that actually are available to disadvantaged children.
Fourth, and perhaps most compelling, the strategy proposed here
tries to take the sting out of the least worthy and most inflexible standards that, like it or not, already are being enforced-those that
penalize failing students by depriving them of diplomas or other benefits without diagnosing their difficulties or availing them of remedial
services (see chart, line 8). By enjoining state officials either to stop
enforcing inflexible standards in an exclusionary fashion or to enforce
them in that manner only after first diagnosing and diverting
resources to children with exceptional needs, this strategy permits
children placed at risk by minimum standards to neutralize the stan283

See supra notes 94, 100, 119 and accompanying text.
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dards' exclusionary venom while incidentally extracting whatever
educational nectar might be present.284
Extending my guesswork beyond the level of even minimally adequate education, let me offer the following very tentative conclusions
about four common types of minimum-standards legislation and the
desirability of efforts to enforce the duties they imply:
Minimum-curriculum requirements. Today, many states prescribe
curricula in mandatory statutes that specify the officials obliged to
provide and the children entitled to take certain courses.285 The specificity of minimum-curriculum standards makes them highly enforceable but may undermine their educational value because the inputbenefits such standards confer may be narrow and only ambiguously
related to desired outcomes; in addition, they deprive teachers and
principals of needed programmatic and allocative flexibility. These
circumstances probably render minimum-curriculum standards more
attractive to advocacy groups concerned with moderating enforcement costs and serving the self-identified needs of individual clients
than to groups concerned with maximizing the educational impact of
their efforts-to use legal-profession paradigms, "legal services" as
opposed to "public interest" groups.
Minimum competency tests. As noted above, the standards that
minimum competency tests impose on children often are inflexible,
hence unworthy of enforcement against children, while the standards
they impose on officials often are only implicit, hence imperfectly
enforceable against officials.286 On the other hand, precisely because
competency-testing requirements so frequently are used punitively
against children, they present a particularly attractive case for tableturning enforcement against officials. Enforcement of pure competency-testing provisions accordingly seems warranted if two conditions are met. First, school officials must in fact be using such tests
punitively. Second, given the testing statute's terms and legislative
history,287 its applicability to all children,288 the educational centrality
284 Likewise, if the strategy causes states to lower standards because school officials cannot

enable certain groups of children to meet them, then at the least the strategy will have relieved
those children of the a fortiori unfair requirement that they meet the standards or be punished.
285 See supra note 95.

286 See supra notes 99, 181-85 and accompanying text. On the prevalence of these kinds of
standards, see supra note 95.
287 See, e.g., supra notes 113, 122-23 and accompanying text.
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or wide acceptability of the subject-matter it tests, the severity of the
harm it inflicts on children who do not pass the test, and other circumstances, there are strong grounds for inferring a duty on the part
of school officials to provide and a right of children to receive the
educational resources necessary to enable willing children to pass the
tests.289
Testing requirements that triggerremedial assistance. A number of
states combine competency-testing programs with a requirement of
remedial services for students falling below standard.29° Such provisions are likely candidates for enforcement. They clearly create duties
to provide remedial services. They more clearly embody an underlying duty to educate, given their test-remedy-test-diploma format, than
do statutes prescribing only diploma-determining tests. They usually
permit substantial flexibility in designing "appropriate" remedial services that in fact improve outcomes. And, finally, they often afford
occasions for enforcement well before graduation, when enforcement
efforts actually can do some good.
Programsdesigned to identiyfailingschools and to generateplans to
improve them. A growing number of states have adopted schoolfocused statutes using outcome measures to trigger some kind of
"school-improvement" effort. 29 1 These statutes are attractive enforcement candidates for the same reasons listed in the preceding paragraph. Additionally, such statutes are attractive enforcement targets
because they typically expand the class of duty holders beyond the
school level to the district and state levels 92 and the class of benefi288 Exceptions for special-education and limited-English-proficiency students need not
undermine the availability of this factor. See supra note 233.
289 To neutralize the defense that student motivation rather than school officials' violation
of a duty to educate caused the students to fail, advocates should proceed on behalf of
relatively large groups of failing students highly concentrated in specific classes, grades,
schools, or school districts. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 102 and 122.
291 See supra notes 102, 140 and 170.
292 Among the duties such legislation creates are that of: (1) state officials to conduct annual

reviews; (2) school officials to prepare (and to involve teachers and parents in preparing)
improvement plans; (3) district and state level officials to review such plans and to provide the
resources and technical assistance necessary to implement them; and (4) school-, district-, and
state-level officials to implement and monitor implementation of the plans. For a report by the

Comptroller of New York concluding that the New York State Department of Education has
just these kinds of duties and has defaulted on them in regard to the New York City schools,
see Office of the State Comptroller, The Board of Regents and the State Education
Department: Oversight of New York City Schools (Report No. 88-S-182, July 1988).
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ciaries to all students in a particular school. 2 9 3
Without finally establishing whether existing minimum-standards
legislation adds up to a "a minimally adequate education," much less
one the courts are currently disposed to enforce intact, the foregoing
analysis suggests that a sufficient package of educationally and judicially viable enforcement candidates can be identified to justify
deploying them on behalf of children consigned to schools that, by the
state's own criteria, are failing.
III.

CONCLUSION

While looking forward to a wider range of strategies available for
implementing Brown when it reaches middle age, I have operated here
within the much more limited field of vision that our "thirtysomething" era philosophically, politically, and practically allows. Even
with sights thus lowered, it is possible to identify methods for carrying forward the work the Court commenced thirty-five years ago.
First, taking our era at its process-oriented word-that the primary
purpose of the equal protection clause is not the equalization of distributive outcomes but rather the expulsion of racial motivations from
the political process-it is possible to reorient school desegregation
itself as an effective means of reconstructing the political process governing schools so that such motivations rationally cannot intervene.
Second, it is possible to justify the modestly distributive impact of
school desegregation reconstructively understood-and the even more
forthrightly distributive character of different understandings of
desegregation and other longstanding education-oriented strategies,
such as finance-equity litigation-by recollecting to ourselves, our
advocacy forums, and our adversaries the respected place that educational distributivism has in our own nation's history and in liberal
polities generally. Finally, it is possible to identify a new educationoriented strategy that finds in current minimum-educational standards and related legislative reforms not only a new reflection of the
special place educational distributivism has in our polity, but also the
seeds of a democratically legitimated and judicially enforceable right
to a minimally adequate education.
293 One caution: By presenting courts with so much responsibility for trouble-shooting
entire educational systems, enforcement efforts premised on statutes creating this wealth of
duties and beneficiaries might expand the demands placed on judges beyond the modest levels
that the proposed strategy strives to maintain. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.

